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ABSTRACT
The standard formalist account of Article II’s Executive Vesting
Clause is that “the executive power” refers to all the powers and
authorities possessed by the executive magistrate in Great Britain prior
to the Constitution’s adoption, subject to the assignment of such powers
and authorities to the other departments of the national government. In
recent papers, a handful of scholars have challenged this “residual
vesting thesis” by amassing evidence that “the executive power”
textually referred only to the power to carry law into execution and not
to the bundle of other royal prerogatives—for example over foreign
affairs and national security—enjoyed by the British monarch.
According to the advocates of both accounts, the scope and nature of
the executive is dramatically altered depending on which account one
adopts.
This Article dissents from both views. “The executive power” was
indeed about law execution and was not a residual grant of power; but
both the Founding generation and its key guide, Blackstone, likely
shared a “thick” understanding of this power. Their writings and
statements suggest that “the executive power,” even in its narrower lawexecution sense, plausibly included the powers to appoint, remove, and
direct executive officers and to promulgate regulations as necessary
incidents to law execution. Not only is this account consistent with
Blackstone and the historical meaning of “the executive power,” but it
better fits the available data from the Constitutional Convention and
early practice than either of the other two accounts. The residual vesting
thesis requires us to believe that the Committee of Detail ignored the
instructions of the delegates in the Constitutional Convention, to infer
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that the delegates themselves were unaware of the implications of what
they had written, and to ignore the fact that not a single opponent of the
Constitution during ratification so much as mentioned the possibility
of a residual grant. On the other hand, the law-execution thesis, at least
a “thin” version of it, may not account for important practices and
precedents. The “thick” view of “the executive power” advanced in this
Article is the theory of best fit: it is the only one that fits the text, the
Framers’ apparent intent, and the historical practice. The upshot of this
approach is that the president probably has more power in the domestic
sphere than under a thin law-execution account but less in foreign
affairs than under the residual vesting thesis.
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INTRODUCTION
Article I of the United States Constitution creates a national
government of limited and enumerated legislative powers; it declares
that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States.”1 Article II creates the executive
branch, but its vesting clause is formulated differently: “The executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”2
The Article II Vesting Clause does not say only those executive powers
“herein granted” shall be vested in the president; rather, it says “the
executive power” shall be vested in the president.
This distinct formulation has caused much controversy over the
past 230 years because Article II nonetheless contains an enumeration
of some kind. The first paragraph of Article II, Section 2 declares the
president to be the commander in chief of the armed forces and grants
the president the power to demand written opinions from the principal
officers of the executive departments and to grant reprieves and
pardons.3 The second paragraph of Section 2 gives the president and
the Senate certain shared powers, namely to make treaties and
appointments, although Congress may place responsibility for the
appointment of inferior officers in the president alone, the heads of
departments, or the courts.4

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
2. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
3. The first clause states, in full:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of
the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in
each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
Id. § 2, cl. 1.
4. The second clause states, in full:
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
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Article II, Section 3, then seems to involve the president’s duties
and relationship to Congress. The president must from time to time
give Congress information about the state of the union; may convene
Congress on extraordinary occasions and may adjourn them in the
event the House and Senate disagree about adjournment; and “shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission
all the Officers of the United States.”5 This paragraph also gives the
president the duty to “receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers.”6
There are at least three ways to read the Executive Vesting Clause
in light of this structure. The prevailing view among formalists may be
termed the “residual vesting thesis.”7 According to this view, the
vesting clause of Article II, unlike the parallel clause in Article I, vests
all executive-type powers in the president, including those traditionally
exercised by the British monarch. The subsequent enumeration in
Article II—and elsewhere in the Constitution—is then largely a
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Id. § 2, cl. 2.
5. Section 3 contains only one clause:
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union,
and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of
them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall
receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.
Id. § 3.
6. Id. I am indebted to Professor Michael W. McConnell for the insight about this structure.
The first paragraph of Section 2 appears to include powers held by the president alone, which
McConnell describes as prerogative power indefeasible by statute. MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL,
THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING (forthcoming Nov. 2020) (manuscript at 207) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal). The second paragraph of Section 2 appears to include
prerogative powers the president shares with the Senate, id. (manuscript at 208), and the first
paragraph of Section 3 appears to include power and duties the president has with respect to
Congress and Congress’s laws, id. (manuscript at 210–11). McConnell thinks the clause respecting
the commissioning of officers was left over from an earlier draft of the Constitution when
Congress and the Senate had most of the appointment power. Id. (manuscript at 212).
7. See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal
Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1185 (2019) [hereinafter Mortenson, Royal Prerogative]
(explaining that “[a]mong constitutional originalists,” this thesis “remains dominant”); Julian
Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 8) [hereinafter Mortenson, Executive Power Clause], https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3406350 [https://perma.cc/5NKB-8953] (describing this thesis as “easily the dominant
historical account among modern commentators”). However, the cross-reference theory may be
the predominant view in the academy and the judiciary. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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limitation on the president’s ability to exercise specific executive
powers, or is perhaps a confirmation of them.8 Two proponents of this
view, Professors Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsey, explain it in
the foreign-affairs context:
[T]he President’s executive foreign affairs power is residual,
encompassing . . . executive foreign affairs powers not allocated
elsewhere by the Constitution’s text. The Constitution’s allocation of
specific foreign affairs powers or roles to Congress or the Senate are
properly read as assignments away from the President. Absent these
specific allocations, by Article II, Section 1, all traditionally executive
foreign affairs powers would be presidential.9

Professor Michael W. McConnell, in a forthcoming monograph on
executive power, also argues that the Executive Vesting Clause “vests
all national powers of an executive nature in the President, except for
[the] portion of the executive power that is vested elsewhere (mostly
in Congress in Article I, Section 8), and except for the limitations and
qualifications on the particular executive powers that are set forth in
the text.”10 To name but some of these limitations and qualifications,

8. Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 549 (2004) (explaining that the residual vesting thesis “reconciles
the text of the Constitution with the breadth of presidential power by stipulating that the Article
II Vesting Clause grants the President all powers that are in their nature ‘executive,’ subject only
to the specific exceptions and qualifications set forth in the rest of the Constitution”).
9. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs,
111 YALE L.J. 231, 253 (2001) (emphasis omitted). Justice Thomas, relying on Prakash and
Ramsey, adheres to this view. He has written that the president may exercise “unenumerated
foreign affairs powers” by virtue of the textual differences between the vesting clauses of Articles
I and II. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1, 34–35 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). According to Justice Thomas, “By
omitting the words ‘herein granted’ in Article II, the Constitution indicates that the ‘executive
Power’ vested in the President is not confined to those powers expressly identified in the
document. Instead, it includes all powers originally understood as falling within the ‘executive
Power’ of the Federal Government.” Id.
10. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 185–90). For earlier statements of this view,
see EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 4 (4th rev. ed.
1957) (raising the question that, “if there is ‘executive power’ that has been found essential in
other systems of government and is not granted the President in the more specific clauses of
Article II, how is it to be brought within the four corners of the Constitution except by means of
the ‘executive power’ clause?”); id. at 10 (“[T]he blended picture of executive power derivable
from the pages of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone is of a broadly discretionary residual
power available when other governmental powers fail . . . .”); and id. at 14 (“[T]he Framers had
in mind . . . the ‘balanced constitution’ of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, which carried
with it the idea of a divided initiative in the matter of legislation and a broad range of autonomous
executive power or ‘prerogative.’” (emphasis omitted)). Earlier still, Professor Thach argued that
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Article I assigns a number of traditionally executive or prerogative
powers to Congress, such as the powers to declare war, issue letters of
marque, coin money, and regulate fleets and armies.11 On this reading,
Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 2 assigns some of this executive power,
specifically over treaties and appointments, to the president and the
Senate together. And Article II, Section 3 further limits executive
power: Historically the king could prorogue Parliament,12 but the
American president may only adjourn Congress in the event of a
disagreement between the two houses. Further, the president has a
duty to execute Congress’s laws faithfully, by which the Framers may
have meant the president could not suspend the laws or dispense with
them on particular occasions.13
The second possible reading of the Executive Vesting Clause is
what Professor Julian Davis Mortenson calls the “Law Execution”
reading.14 Mortenson maintains that “the executive power” refers only
to one specific power: the power to execute the laws. All of the powers
that are considered “executive” according to the residual vesting thesis
were in fact historically considered to be “prerogative” rather than
“executive” powers, and “the executive power” was but one of these

where, by the terms of the Constitution, the national government is vested with control
over a certain sphere of action, that portion of the field is the President’s which is
executive in character. Thus the Constitution makes the national government the sole
organ for the conduct of foreign affairs. And yet the powers which are necessary for it
to take this duty upon it are not all conferred by the Constitution—the power to
recognize new governments or new States, to dismiss foreign ministers, even to conduct
general negotiations. Since they are not enumerated, they are the President’s as of
constitutional right, being of an executive character.
CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 165 (1923).
11. See infra notes 100–29 and accompanying text for an account of these powers in the
Constitution and in William Blackstone’s commentaries.
12. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 180 (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1765) (“[A]s the king has the sole right of convening the parliament, so also it is
a branch of the royal prerogative, that he may (whenever he pleases) prorogue the parliament for
a time, or put a final period to it’s existence.”). A quick note of grammar: Blackstone and other
eighteenth-century writers used the contraction “it’s” as possessive. The Oxford English
Dictionary has several examples of this usage between 1611 and 1802. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 150–51 (2d ed. 1989).
13. Although there is no “smoking gun” evidence, it is commonly assumed that by faithful
execution the Framers meant to invoke the prohibitions on the suspending and dispensing powers
announced in the Bill of Rights of 1689. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 92–96, 95
n.339) (describing this “consensus” view).
14. Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1180; Mortenson, Executive Power
Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 6).

WURMAN IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20_FIXED CHART (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

IN SEARCH OF PREROGATIVE

9/22/2020 3:13 PM

99

prerogatives.15 This definition of “prerogative” is contrary to
McConnell’s definition, which depends on John Locke’s view of
“prerogative” as executive discretion to act contrary to law.16 Here,
Mortenson seems to have the upper hand because Blackstone used
“prerogative” to refer to power generally and not to the specific power
to act without law,17 and it is Blackstone’s definition of prerogative that
appears to have been widely shared in pre- and post-revolutionary
America.18 Mortenson’s view is also consistent with the routine use of
the term “prerogatives” in the Constitutional Convention to mean

15. Mortenson argues that the “suite of substantive authorities” that Blackstone described
“had a name: ‘The King’s Prerogative.’” Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1223
(quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 230). The first of these royal authorities was “the
‘supreme executive power,’ specifically defined as ‘the right of enforcing the laws.’” Id. (quoting
BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 142–43, 183). “The royal prerogative, as it was understood in the
Founding Era,” Mortenson writes, “comprised a long list of separate and highly particularized
legal authorities within a well-understood framework of English constitutional law” with no
particular “overarching theoretical coherence.” Id. at 1228. “‘The prerogative’ [was] the basket
category for royal power and ‘the executive power’ [was] one specific authority among a great
many in that basket.” Id. at 1229. “[E]xecutive power” in the context of state action was “the
implementing power: the authority to deploy the massed force of the state to bring legislated
intentions into effect, especially the laws and their intended consequences.” Id. at 1237.
16. McConnell defines prerogative as “powers the executive could exercise . . . without need
for legislative authorization and beyond legislative control.” MCCONNELL, supra note 6
(manuscript at 5). Hence, he argues that “[r]esidual executive powers are not prerogative powers:
they may be exercised by the President without advance congressional authorization, but they are
subordinate to exercises of Congress’s enumerated powers.” Id. (manuscript at 203). This
definition, as explained, is taken from John Locke, who wrote that because the lawmaking body
is “too numerous,” “slow,” and “not always in being, . . . and because also it is impossible to
foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities, that may concern the
publick,” there is therefore “a latitude left to the Executive power, to do many things of choice,
which the Laws do not prescribe.” JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 393 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690). The prerogative power, in other words, “can be
nothing, but the Peoples permitting their Rulers, to do several things of their own free choice,
where the Law was silent, and sometimes [this power can go] against the direct Letter of the Law,
for the publick good.” Id. at 395.
17. Blackstone defined the prerogative as “those rights and capacities which the king enjoys
alone, in contradistinction to others, and not to those which he enjoys in common with any of his
subjects.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 232. “The executive power” is precisely such a power
which the king alone enjoyed, that power being “vested by our laws in a single person, the king
or queen.” Id. at 183. Elsewhere, Blackstone described the prerogative as the king’s “authority”
or “power,” id. at 249, which would again include “the executive power.”
18. Matthew Steilen, How To Think Constitutionally About Prerogative: A Study of Early
American Usage, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 557 passim (2018). Professor Matthew Steilen argues that
there are multiple meanings of “prerogative,” and that Locke’s was not widely shared in America.
Id. at 641. Additionally, each of the main usages of the term in America can be subsumed under
the term “power,” including, for example, the king’s prerogative to charter colonies, the colonies’
prerogative (delegated from the king) of self-government, and the like. Id. at 585 & n.84.
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federal as opposed to state power.19 If the Founders shared this
understanding of “prerogative,” then, as Mortenson argues, the
president only has those few prerogative powers expressly granted by
the Constitution. “The executive power” is one such power. Others
include the president’s power to be commander in chief, to receive
ambassadors, to make treaties and appointments with senatorial advice
and consent, to grant reprieves and pardons, and to adjourn the houses
of Congress or call them into session on extraordinary occasions.
Professors John Harrison and Matthew Steilen agree with
Mortenson’s reading of the Executive Vesting Clause. Harrison
describes “the executive power” as the legal capacity “to occupy the
characteristic positions of executive officials in a legal environment of
rules that empower and constrain those officials.”20 “[T]his account of
the Article II executive power,” Harrison summarizes, “rejects the
possibility that it includes any of the British royal prerogative, except
to the extent that the prerogative included the authority to carry out
the law and administer the government, subject to any applicable
statutes.”21 And Steilen, writing a year before Mortenson and
Harrison, examined early-American usage of the term “prerogative”

19. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 164 (Max Farrand
ed., Yale Univ. Press 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND] (“Mr. Pinkney [sic] . . . urged . . . that if the
States were left to act of themselves in any case, it wd. be impossible to defend the national
prerogatives, however extensive they might be on paper.”); id. at 165 (reporting that James
Madison observed during discussions of a negative on state legislation that “[t]his prerogative of
the General Govt. is the great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of
the States”); id. at 317 (recording Madison’s critiques of a plan for “omitting a controul over the
States as a general defence of the federal prerogatives”). James Wilson observed that
[t]he natil. Govt. is one & yt. of the states another — Commerce, War, Peace, Treaties,
&c are peculiar to the former — certain inferior and local Qualities are the province of
the Latter — there is a line of separation; where ever the prerogatives lie[] on the side
of the Genl. Govt. we are citizens of the nation or of the US.
Id. at 416; see also id. at 447 (noting Madison’s description of taxation as “the highest prerogative
of supremacy”).
20. John Harrison, Executive Power 3 (June 3, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398427 [https://perma.cc/CXS2-J8MP].
21. Id. at 26. Professor John Harrison suggests that this vision of the executive was based on
the “Whig theory of executive power.” Id. at 30 (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective
Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1993)); see also Seth Barrett Tillman, The Old
Whig Theory of the Executive Power, NEW REFORM CLUB (Jan. 18, 2019, 5:02 AM),
https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2019/01/the-old-whig-theory-of-executive-power.html [https://
perma.cc/J8NT-4LB9] (“The Executive Power of Article II is wholly an excrescence of Congress’
[power to make statutes] . . . . The Old Whig theory stands in opposition to the Hamiltonian
theory of a core or residuum of undefined executive power which exists absent an express grant
of Article I, Section 7 authority from Congress.”).
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and argues that American writers distinguished that term from “the
executive power,” which was the power only to execute law.22
Third, the “cross-reference” reading maintains that the Executive
Vesting Clause simply establishes who is to exercise “the executive
power,” but the only such powers the president actually has are given
in other parts of Article II. Thus, the president, like Congress, has only
those powers specifically enumerated. Justice Jackson, in his
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,23 adhered to
this view.24 Perhaps as a result of Justice Jackson’s adherence, the
cross-reference theory is probably still the dominant theory among
nonoriginalists.25 For purposes of this Article, however, there are two
reasons to put the cross-reference theory aside. First, it is the least
plausible of the accounts, at least on originalist grounds. If the clause
merely identifies who is to exercise the subsequently granted powers,
then the Take Care Clause must be a grant of power to execute the
laws. Perhaps so, but it is framed as a duty and not a power.26 Moreover,
the parallel clause in Article III must be a grant of substantive power

22. See Steilen, supra note 18, at 563, 642. Professors Curtis Bradley and Martin Flaherty
noted this possibility in 2004:
It is possible . . . that the phrase “executive Power” confers simply a power to execute
the laws. That would help explain, for example, why it is written in the singular rather
than the plural. Indeed, to the extent that there are any Founding statements ascribing
substantive content to the Article II Vesting Clause, they are all statements equating
executive power with the power to execute the laws.
Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8, at 553.
23. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
24. Id. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant
in bulk of all conceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office
of the generic powers thereafter stated.”).
25. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8, at 554 (“[A] significant issue during the drafting of
the Constitution was whether to have a unitary or plural executive. The Article II Vesting Clause
may simply make clear where the executive power is being vested — in a unitary President — not
the scope of that power.”); id. at 554 n.29 (“The records of the Constitutional Convention make
it clear that the purposes of [the Article II Vesting Clause] were simply to settle the question
whether the executive branch should be plural or single and to give the executive a title.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Edward S. Corwin, Comment, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial
Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 53 (1953))); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein,
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47 n.195 (1994) (“[T]he [Article II]
Vesting Clause does nothing more than show who . . . is to exercise the executive power, and not
what that power is.”). This position was even articulated by at least one representative in the great
1789 debate over removal. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 466 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement
of Rep. White) (“[T]he Executive powers so vested, are those enumerated in the Constitution.”);
see infra Part III.A.
26. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .”). Indeed, Blackstone explained that the “principal duty of the king is, to govern
his people according to law.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 226 (emphasis added).
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to judges, otherwise nothing in Article III allows judges to exercise any
power.27 Second, if the Take Care Clause is a grant of law-execution
power, then in any event the law-execution and cross-reference
theories will have similar implications, with the admittedly important
exceptions of presidential removal and administrative control.28
Focusing, then, on the two main contenders—the residual vesting
and law-execution readings—each has critical shortcomings. The
proponents of the residual vesting thesis argue that a plethora of
foreign affairs related powers, such as instructing and recalling
ambassadors, communicating with foreign governments, setting U.S.
foreign policy, entering into executive agreements, and terminating
treaties, seem “inexplicable” and may have “no defensible explanation
of how they fit into the Constitution’s text” without a residual vesting
of executive powers.29 Thus, the law-execution account seems difficult
to square with at least some historical practice.30 And putting aside
27. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1176 (1992) (arguing that Article III’s
Vesting Clause is the “only explicit constitutional source of the federal judiciary’s authority to
act”).
28. Professor McConnell, for example, argues that “the executive power” is entirely
defeasible by statute, and therefore an indefeasible removal power follows from the Take Care
Clause but not the Executive Vesting Clause. See MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 206).
On the reading advanced here, however, “the executive power” is indefeasible. See infra Part III.
Even so, the scope of the removal power may very well differ based on whether it stems from one
or the other clause. The Take Care Clause, for example, may be satisfied by for-cause removal
provisions. So long as a subordinate officer is exercising discretion consistently with law, there
would be no grounds for removal, and no Take Care violation. But if the removal power comes
from the Executive Vesting Clause, then the president may direct how a subordinate exercises
discretion.
29. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 243–52.
30. McConnell writes: “If the President were limited to the enumerated powers in Sections
2 and 3,” then “every president from Washington through Obama and Trump would have been
exceeding his proper powers, and flagrantly so.” MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 186).
McConnell argues that Article II “fail[s] to address some powers of immense importance, such as
the power to direct foreign policy,” and among these are “entering international agreements,
supporting or opposing foreign insurrections, forming or breaking alliances, voting in bodies like
the United Nations, recognizing foreign regimes, locating embassies, [and] abrogating treaties.”
Id. (manuscript at 10–11). “The gap in domestic matters is less glaring but also concerning,” he
writes: “The President has express authority to demand the opinions of his officers, but no express
authority to give them guidance or commands. That must be an ‘executive’ power, but it is not
enumerated.” Id. He says later in his monograph that interpreting the other grants of power in
Article II as conferring the panoply of foreign affairs functions exercised by the president “would
entail such a latitude of construction as to make the limiting language of the Constitution
illusory.” Id. (manuscript at 189). Other foreign affairs scholars agree that many foreign affairs
powers seem extra-constitutional or missing, even if those scholars do not agree with the residual
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foreign policy,31 the law-execution reading does not account for
broader presidential power in the domestic sphere, such as a
presidential removal power, which many in the Founding generation
seem to have believed was included within “the executive power.”32
Yet the advocates of the residual vesting thesis ignore at least two
inconvenient, and critical, facts. First, understanding the grant of “the
executive power” to be a residual grant of prerogative powers requires
believing that the Committee of Detail that composed the initial draft
of the Constitution ignored the instructions of the Convention, which
had voted to give the national executive only the authority to execute
the laws and to appoint to offices not otherwise provided for.33 Second,
it requires ignoring that not a single opponent of ratification so much
as mentioned the possibility of a residual grant, even among those who
feared the scope of powers conferred upon the national executive.34
And to these inconvenient facts this Article adds a third and fourth: the
Convention’s debate over the power to erect corporations and the
delegates’ likely views on immigration suggest none of the delegates
themselves perceived that the Executive Vesting Clause would confer
a residuum of prerogative powers.35
This Article takes a fresh look at debates over “the executive
power” in light of recent scholarship and offers a new account, one that
better fits the text, the intent of the Framers, and the historical practice.
“The executive power” did, indeed, seem to refer only to the power of
law execution, but there is a thin version of this executive power and a
thicker version. The former consists in only the power to carry into
execution Congress’s laws with the precise tools, officers, and
prescriptions Congress itself chooses. In contrast, the latter plausibly

vesting thesis. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 13–15 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing that many government foreign affairs powers are
“not mentioned” by and are “missing” from the Constitution and noting myriad examples).
31. Indeed, it may be that some exercises of presidential foreign affairs authority simply are
unconstitutional; it is odd that the proponents of the residual vesting thesis rarely consider that
possibility.
32. See infra Part III.A.
33. For the drafting history, see infra Part II.C. Regarding the Committee of Detail,
McConnell writes that although the Convention gave the president “only the powers of law
execution and appointment to offices other than judges, soon to be augmented by a qualified
veto,” the Committee of Detail “reinstated a vesting clause at least as broad as the original”
resolution granting general executive rights and powers. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript
at 56).
34. See MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 75).
35. For this novel argument, see infra Part II.B.
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includes the power to issue regulations and to appoint, remove, and
direct executive officers in furtherance of law execution. This Article
shows that the thick law-execution understanding of “the executive
power” is consistent with Blackstone, with the work of the
Constitutional Convention, and with Founding-era debates and other
historical practice. Indeed, it is the only available theory that truly
seems to fit. It therefore represents the most probable meaning of the
Executive Vesting Clause.36
To make the case, Part I surveys the textual evidence already laid
out by other scholars. It seeks to show, without reinventing the wheel,
that this textual evidence favors the law-execution reading, although it
is not entirely unambiguous. It then looks specifically at Blackstone’s
use of “the executive power,” given Blackstone’s apparent influence
on the constitutional drafters.37

36. Originalists look to text, structure, intent, and early historical practice to ascertain the
likely original meaning, or the range of plausible meanings, of a particular constitutional
provision. See, e.g., ILAN WURMAN, A DEBT AGAINST THE LIVING: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ORIGINALISM 18–20 (2017) (arguing that intent is evidence of textual meaning); William Baude,
Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2019) (articulating a theory uniting
originalism and historical practice); Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and Structural Argument, 113
NW. U. L. REV. 1297, 1298–1301 (2019) (noting a variety of structural arguments made by
originalists). Of course, it could be that early practice was simply inconsistent with text, or the
text with the intent, and so on. In other words, these interpretive tools do not always have to align
for us to know the original meaning of a particular provision. But the more those tools do align,
the more likely the interpretation is to be correct.
37. McConnell describes Blackstone’s influence:
A principal conclusion is that the framers self-consciously analyzed each of the
prerogative powers of the British monarch as listed in Blackstone’s Commentaries, but
did not vest all (or even most) of them in the American executive. Instead, some were
vested in Congress, some were vested in the President, and some where [sic] denied to
the national government altogether.
MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 12). McConnell further notes that “William Winslow
Crosskey of the University of Chicago was the first to note that the enumeration of powers by the
Committee of Detail was as much about legislative-executive separation of powers as it was about
federalism.” Id. (manuscript at 56) (first citing 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 428–29 (1953); then citing GERHARD
CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 21 (1997)). For Blackstone’s
general influence, see Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1220 & n.189 (“But for
Americans like James Madison, Blackstone’s treatise was the ‘book which is in every man’s
hand’—central to pedagogy, drafting, and litigation alike as the standard restatement of the
formal constitutional law of England.” (quoting Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 18,
1788) (statement of James Madison), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION 1371, 1382 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993))) and id.
at 1221 n.189 (“[T]he honied Mansfieldism of Blackstone became the Student’s Hornbook, [and]
from that moment, that profession (the nursery of our Congress) began to slide into toryism, and
nearly all the young brood of lawyers now are of that hue.” (alteration in original) (quoting Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: POLITICAL
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Part II turns to the structure of the Constitution itself as it emerged
from the Constitutional Convention, and to the debates that occurred
there and after. Part II.A suggests—as has been suggested before38—
that the Framers’ key guide on executive power was likely Blackstone.
Almost every single power Blackstone listed as belonging to the British
monarch the U.S. Constitution assigns to some department of the
national government. Part II.B then argues that the omission of certain
prerogative powers—those over the erection of corporations and over
immigration—is particularly telling. This Article, for the first time in
the scholarship, analyzes these omissions and their implications for the
residual vesting thesis. The omissions suggest that the delegates did not
understand the Executive Vesting Clause to be a residual grant of
power. Part II.C briefly addresses two other known historical points:
the Convention’s instruction to the Committee of Detail, and the
absence of any evidence for the residual vesting thesis in the
Ratification debates. Finally, Part II.D argues that the law-execution
account makes the most sense of the variations in the three vesting
clauses. Putting these data together, Part II makes a comprehensive
argument for the law-execution reading of the Executive Vesting
Clause.
Parts III and IV turn to historical practice and post-Ratification
separation of powers debates. Part III examines domestic separation
of powers debates and argues that a “thick” law-execution reading of
the Executive Vesting Clause has significant explanatory power for the
debates involving appointments, removals, prosecutorial power,
administrative regulations, and seizing steel mills. For example, this
Part shows that Blackstone understood the prerogative power to issue
proclamations as to the “manner, time, and circumstances of putting
[the] laws in execution”39 to be part of “the executive power of the
laws.” Once this is understood, the real issue in Youngstown was not
whether the president had some “emergency” or “inherent” power to
seize the steel mills; the debate was rather over whether the president’s
action was actually in execution of Congress’s various laws or was an
act of new lawmaking. In other words, it was a debate over whether or
WRITINGS 57, 58 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 2004))). But see Martin Jordan Minot,
Note, The Irrelevance of Blackstone: Rethinking the Eighteenth-Century Importance of the
Commentaries, 104 VA. L. REV. 1359, 1362–63 (2018) (arguing that other thinkers dominated
legal education and early American understandings of the common law). The present Article
confirms Blackstone’s crucial influence on the overall structure of the Constitution.
38. See supra note 37.
39. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 261.

WURMAN IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20_FIXED CHART (DO NOT DELETE)

106

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/22/2020 3:13 PM

[Vol. 70:93

not the president was properly exercising a “proclamation” power to
help carry into execution the existing laws. Justice Jackson’s famous
concurrence was a distraction from the case’s true controversy.
Part IV argues that many foreign affairs powers can also be
fruitfully analyzed under this thick understanding of “the executive
power,” particularly the powers to declare neutrality, terminate
treaties, instruct and recall ambassadors, set foreign policy, recognize
foreign governments, and enter into executive agreements. Here,
however, although the thick understanding explains some of these
presidential powers, others it cannot explain—at least not as
exclusively presidential powers.40 The upshot of all this is that the
president probably has more power in the domestic sphere than under
a thin law-execution reading, but likely less in foreign affairs than
under a residual grant.
If this is right, then the implications of the various theories can be
represented as follows, where the leftmost column represents the
question of whether the president has that particular power:

40. For example, it is not even clear that the ability to “set” foreign policy is a “power” in
the constitutional sense. Anyone can talk—whether the president (or anyone else) has the
authority to make good on that talk is another matter entirely. See infra Part IV.B.4.
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I. THE TEXTUAL MEANING OF “THE EXECUTIVE POWER”
The textual evidence for the meaning of “the executive power”
over which scholars have argued is mixed, although the law-execution
reading is the better reading. Part I.A predominantly examines
evidence from political thinkers who were influential on the Founders,
from state constitutions, and from Alexander Hamilton. Part I.B
specifically addresses Blackstone’s view of executive power.
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A. Competing Textual Evidence
1. Influential Political Thinkers. John Locke’s Second Treatise on
Government was deeply influential on the Founding generation.41
Locke describes an “executive power” in the domestic sphere and a
“federative power” in the foreign affairs space. After discussing the
legislative power, Locke writes that because the laws “need a perpetual
Execution, . . . [it is] necessary there should be a Power always in being,
which should see to the Execution of the Laws that are made, and
remain in force. And thus the Legislative and Executive Power come
often to be separated.”42 Here, “the executive power” is defined as “the
execution of the laws that are made.” Locke then writes that there is
“another” power involving the relations between members of one
political community and those of another; “[t]his therefore contains the
Power of War and Peace, Leagues and Alliances, and all the
Transactions, with all Persons and Communities without the
Commonwealth, and may be called Federative, if any one pleases.”43
Locke explains that although “[t]hese two Powers, Executive and
Federative,” are “really distinct in themselves, . . . they are always
almost united” in a single person because both require “the force of
the Society for their exercise.”44 Professors Prakash and Ramsey write
of Locke’s discussion that “[a]lthough the powers were distinct as a
theoretical matter, Locke could cite the powers interchangeably,
because he had stated that they were inseparable.”45 Yet Locke is not
a sure guide on this score. Some of the specific powers that Locke
describes as federative—war and peace and leagues and alliances—
were distinctly given to Congress or the Senate in coordination with
the president. The Framers rejected Locke’s very proposition that
these powers are “always almost united” in a single magistrate;

41. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27–
30 (enlarged ed. 1992) (describing John Locke’s influence on Founding-generation Americans);
ALAN GIBSON, INTERPRETING THE FOUNDING 13–21 (2006) (describing the prominent
twentieth-century interpretation of the Founding “that the core of the Founders’ political thought
is encapsulated in the Lockean variation of the principles of classical liberalism”); Jack N.
Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1598 (1997) (“There is
no question that politically articulate eighteenth-century Americans—and certainly members of
the political elite—were eclectically conversant with the works of luminaries like Hobbes, Locke,
Montesquieu, Hume, and Blackstone.”).
42. LOCKE, supra note 16, at 382–83.
43. Id. at 383 (emphasis omitted).
44. Id. at 383–84 (emphasis omitted).
45. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 268.
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decisions to go to war and to enter into treaties require just as much
policymaking, if not more policymaking, than they require the
application of any force. Hence James Wilson in the Constitutional
Convention observed that “the great qualities in the several parts of
the Executive are vigor and dispatch,” but “[m]aking peace and war
are generally determined by Writers on the Laws of Nations to be
legislative powers.”46
Instead of treating Locke’s executive and federative powers as
united in a single person, then, the Framers appear to have maintained
the distinction and assigned the bundle of federative powers away from
the chief magistrate. Or, as Professor Harrison puts it, “The strongest
indication that the Constitution does not employ Locke’s typology is
that it vests three powers, [the legislative, executive, and judicial,] not
four.”47 It excludes the federative power.
Montesquieu was also deeply influential on the Framers.48 In
Montesquieu’s famous treatise, The Spirit of the Laws, he calls the
federative power a type of “executive” power: “In each state there are
three sorts of powers: legislative power, executive power over the
things depending on the right of nations, and executive power over the
things depending on civil right.”49 By the second of these powers the
magistrate “makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies,
establishes security, and prevents invasions,” and by the third “he
punishes crimes or judges disputes between individuals.”50

46. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 73–74. Professor McConnell suspects that William Pierce,
who reported this remark from Wilson, may have misheard Wilson. MCCONNELL, supra note 6
(manuscript at 33). That seems unlikely. According to Madison,
Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch and responsibility
to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper
guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a
Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace [etc.]. The only powers he
conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers,
not ⟨appertaining to and⟩ appointed by the Legislature.
FARRAND, supra note 19, at 65–66. McConnell believes that “among others” refers to powers not
legislative in nature, MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 33), but it seems more natural to
read it as saying “among other examples of legislative powers, that of war & peace [etc.].” This
would be consistent with Pierce’s note.
47. Harrison, supra note 20, at 24; see also Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8, at 560 (arguing
that Locke “distinguishes executive power from foreign relations power”).
48. BAILYN, supra note 41, at 27–30; Rakove, supra note 41, at 1598.
49. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 156 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller
& Harold Samuel Stone eds., 1989) (1748).
50. Id. at 156–57.
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Montesquieu therefore calls this last power “the power of judging,”
and the other “the executive power of the state.”51
This is evidence in favor of the residual vesting thesis, but just as
with Locke, one cannot put too much emphasis on it. It appears that
only Thomas Rutherforth employed a similar taxonomy, calling
Locke’s federative power the “executive power” and Locke’s
“executive power” a “power of judging.”52 Instead, the Framers clearly
separated the execution of the laws from the power to judge, lodging
the former in the national executive and the latter in the courts,
suggesting that they rejected Montesquieu’s taxonomy. Moreover,
Professor Mortenson claims that this passage from Montesquieu was
never cited in the Convention or ratification debates.53
Yet, as Mortenson recognizes, the famous Essex Result, by which
several Massachusetts towns expressed their disapproval of a proposed
state constitution, did use Montesquieu’s taxonomy54:
The executive power is sometimes divided into the external executive,
and internal executive. The former comprehends war, peace, the
sending and receiving ambassadors, and whatever concerns the
transactions of the state with any other independent state. The
confederation of the United States of America hath lopped off this
branch of the executive, and placed it in Congress. We have therefore
only to consider the internal executive power, which is employed in
the peace, security and protection of the subject and his property, and
in the defence of the state. The executive power is to marshal and
command her militia and armies for her defence, to enforce the law,
and to carry into execution all the orders of the legislative powers.55

51. Id. at 157.
52. Rutherforth casts the judiciary in terms of its underlying executive nature:
The second branch of executive power, which is called external executive power, . . . is
the power of acting with the common strength or jo[i]nt force of the society to guard
against such injuries, as threaten it from without; to obtain amends for the damages
arising from such injuries; or to inflict punishment upon the authors and abettors of
them.
2 THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 54 (Cambridge, J. Bentham 1756).
Mortenson writes that Rutherforth was the only writer to adopt this idiosyncratic view of the
taxonomy of internal and external executive power. Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7,
at 1251.
53. Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1259.
54. Id. at 1250 n.347.
55. RESULT OF THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES HOLDEN AT IPSWICH IN THE COUNTY OF
ESSEX, WHO WERE DEPUTED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE CONSTITUTION AND FORM
OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSED BY THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS-BAY
(Newbury-Port, John Mycall 1778), reprinted in THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL
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Even though this document may not have had much impact outside of
Massachusetts at the time, and it predated the drafting of the U.S.
Constitution by about a decade, it still suggests that Montesquieu was
on the bookshelf of educated Americans of the period.
Another influential writer was Jean de Lolme, who published the
final edition of his work, The Constitution of England, in 1784.56 De
Lolme writes that when Parliament ceases to exist, “its laws still
continue to be in force: the King remains charged with the execution
of them, and is supplied with the necessary power for that purpose.”57
He then adds that the king was “the representative, and the depositary,
of all the power and collective majesty of the Nation; he sends and
receives ambassadors; he contracts alliances; and has the prerogative
of declaring war, and of making peace, on whatever conditions he
thinks proper.”58 In the beginning of the very next chapter, de Lolme
states that “[t]he King not only unites in himself all the branches of the
Executive power,—he not only disposes, without controul, of the
whole military power in the State,—but he is moreover, it seems,
Master of the Law itself,” as he can dismiss Parliament.59 In this last
passage, de Lolme could be describing all of these powers as “branches
of the Executive power,” including the power over the military. Or he
could be saying that the king unites in himself all branches of “the
executive power,” and also controls the military and the legislative
power of the state. On this reading, the control of the military is distinct
from “all the branches of the Executive power.” This reading seems
more plausible because “the executive power” would include more
than simply military control, suggesting that de Lolme’s reference to
military control was not an appositive referencing back to “the
executive power,” but rather was mentioned in that passage as an
independent power.
The meaning of “the executive power” is therefore not
unequivocal. In Locke, the executive and federative powers are

AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780, at 324, 337 (Oscar
Handlin & Mary Handlin eds., 1966).
56. See JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL
IMAGINATION 197–98 (1992) (describing how John Adams took “closely copied” notes from de
Lolme’s 1784 revisions); BAILYN, supra note 41, at 27 (noting de Lolme’s broader influence).
57. J.L. DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND bk. I, ch. IV, at 71 (London, G.
Robinson & J. Murray 4th ed. 1784); see also Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1231
n.267.
58. DE LOLME, supra note 57, at 73.
59. Id. at 74.
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distinct; in Montesquieu there are distinct “executive” powers to
administer law, which he redefines as the power of judging, and to
conduct foreign policy; and in de Lolme it is not entirely clear if “the
executive power” includes other prerogative powers, or is simply a
power to execute law.
Mortenson, however, quite exhaustively goes through other
sources, particularly those from the seventeenth century.60 In these
sources, the term “the executive power,” when used in the singular and
not to refer to the institution of the executive, almost always (perhaps
always) referred to the power to carry laws into execution. For
example, in 1698, political theorist Algernon Sidney wrote, “The
Sword of Justice comprehends the legislative and the executive Power:
the one is exercised in making Laws, the other in judging Controversies
according to such as are made.”61 Here, although executive and judicial
functions are not yet separated, the implication is that the legislative
power makes the laws while “the executive power” carries them into
execution. James Harrington similarly wrote, “[T]he hand of the
magistrate is the executive power of the law, so the head of the
magistrate is answerable unto the people that his execution be
according unto the law; . . . the hand or sword that executeth the law is
in it, and not above it.”62 Robert Filmer wrote, “By these words of
legislative, nomothetical and architectonical power, in plain English, [is
understood] a power of making laws. And by gubernative and
executive, a power of putting those laws in execution by judging and
punishing offenders.”63
Emer de Vattel, a continental author, wrote, “The executive
power naturally belongs to the sovereign,—to every conductor of a
people: he is supposed to be invested with it, in its fullest extent, when
the fundamental laws do not restrict it. When the laws are established,
it is the prince’s province to have them put in execution.”64 And then,
of course, there is Jean-Jacques Rousseau:
60. See Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1230–43. For a selection of the sources
uncovered by Mortenson, see infra notes 61–66 and accompanying text.
61. ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 295 (London 1698).
62. JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA 15 (London 1656), as
reprinted in THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 155, 174 (J.G.A. Pocock ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1977).
63. ROBERT FILMER, THE ANARCHY OF A LIMITED OR MIXED MONARCHY 4 (London
1648), as reprinted in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 131, 136 (Johann P. Sommerville ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
64. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. I, ch. XIII, § 162, at 187 (Béla Kapossy &
Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1797).
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When I walk towards an object, it is necessary first that I should
resolve to go that way and secondly that my feet should carry
me. . . . The body politic has the same two motive powers – and we
can make the same distinction between will and strength, the former
is legislative power and the latter executive power.65

These statements, and the others that Mortenson uncovers,66 are
quite persuasive. They suggest that “the executive power” represented
“force,” but the legislative power, which represented “will,” had to
direct that force.67 This is also consistent with some Founding-era
statements, such as those of Hamilton writing as Pacificus, describing
“the executive power” “as that Power which is charged with the
command and application of the Public Force.”68 This implies some
prior direction from some other authority, with the exception perhaps
of repelling invasion.
In summary, most uses of the term “the executive power” were
references to law execution. A small handful of eighteenth-century
writers, however, such as Montesquieu and the authors of the Essex
Result, plausibly included Locke’s federative power within “the
executive power.”
2. State Constitutions and “Executive Powers.” State constitutions
also reveal ambiguity about the meaning of “the executive power.”
Professor Harrison relies in particular on the constitutions of Virginia

65. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. III, ch. I, at 101 (Maurice
Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762).
66. Mortenson also argues that the executive power was entirely controllable by the
legislative power; this is further evidence that “the executive power” was nothing more than the
power to execute law. Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 62–69).
For example, “A Farmer” wrote during the ratification debates that “[t]he power of making rules
or laws to govern or protect the society is the essence of sovereignty, for by this the executive and
judicial powers are directed and controuled, to this every ministerial agent is subservient.” A
Farmer, The Fallacies of the Freeman detected by a Farmer, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Apr. 16 & 23,
1788, reprinted in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 133, 134 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995). And a generation
later, Charles Francis Adams wrote, “This legislative power is then the precise measure of the
executive power.” CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, AN APPEAL FROM THE NEW TO THE OLD WHIGS
15 (Bos., Russell, Odiorne & Co. 1835).
67. Professor Philip Hamburger has suggested to me that the tripartite separation of powers
goes farther back to the medieval separation among force, will, and judgment. That seems
plausible and consistent with the above quotations, and it would be further support for my thesis:
there can be no force without will. The residual vesting thesis maintains, on the other hand, that
sometimes the executive may exercise force without any indication of congressional will.
68. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. I (June 29, 1793), in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS
DEBATES OF 1793-1794, at 8, 11 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007) [hereinafter PACIFICUS].
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and Maryland from 1776 for his claim that the Founding generation
likely shared the narrow, Whig conception of “the executive power.”69
Both constitutions granted the state governors the “executive powers
of government” but only “according to the laws,” and then prohibited
the exercise of “any power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute
or custom of England,” with some enumerated exceptions.70 This
suggests that even when the Founding generation used the term
“executive powers” in the plural, such powers could still only be
exercised “according to the laws”; that is, such powers, even if they
went beyond law execution, were defeasible and controllable by the
legislature.
Some state constitutions used the term “executive powers” in the
plural but did not expressly forbid the exercise of prerogative powers.
Even in these constitutions, the “executive powers” were to be
exercised according to the laws. The Delaware Constitution of 1776
declared that the president of the state had the power to lay embargoes,
grant reprieves and pardons, and “may exercise all the other executive
powers of government, limited and restrained as by this constitution is
mentioned, and according to the laws of the State.”71 Listing out
embargoes and pardons and then declaring that the president “may
exercise all the other executive powers of government” suggests that
the royal prerogative powers were here described as “executive.” On

69. Harrison, supra note 20, at 29–30.
70. Under the Virginia Constitution, the governor
shall, with the advice of a Council of State, exercise the executive powers of
government, according to the laws of this Commonwealth; and shall not, under any
pretence, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute or custom of
England. But he shall, with the advice of the Council of State, have the power of
granting reprieves or pardons, except where the prosecution shall have been carried on
by the House of Delegates, or the law shall otherwise particularly direct; in which cases,
no reprieve or pardon shall be granted, but by resolve of the House of Delegates.
VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3812, 3816–17
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS]. As provided in the
corresponding clause of the Maryland Constitution,
the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Council, may embody the
militia; and, when embodied, shall alone have the direction thereof; and shall also have
the direction of all the regular land and sea forces, under the laws of this State . . . ; and
may alone exercise all other the executive powers of government, where the concurrence
of the Council is not required, according to the laws of this State; and grant reprieves or
pardons for any crime, except in such cases where the law shall otherwise direct; and
may, during the recess of the General Assembly, lay embargoes . . . ; but the Governor
shall not, under any pretence, exercise any power or prerogative by virtue of any law,
statute, or custom of England or Great Britain.
MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1686, 1696 (emphasis
added).
71. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 7, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 562–63.
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the other hand, these other powers could only be exercised “according
to the laws of the State.” Georgia’s 1777 constitution is particularly
telling, providing that the governor and council shall “exercise the
executive powers of government, according to the laws of this State and
the constitution thereof, save only in the case of pardons and remission
of fines, which he shall in no instance grant.”72 Here, too, the various
prerogative powers are all considered “executive powers,” but they are
all subject to the laws.73 In short, these constitutions seem to have
included other traditional prerogative powers within the term
“executive powers” (plural). In the absence of further legislation, the
chief executive could exercise those powers, but the legislature could
always step in. It is not entirely clear whether the governors of these
states could exercise only those executive powers specifically
enumerated; the point is only that “executive powers” could
encompass more than mere law execution, but were subject always to
whatever laws the legislature happened to make.
New York’s constitution is recognized as the key state model for
the federal Constitution’s chief executive because it was the only state
constitution that granted a governor robust executive powers.74 New
York’s constitution vested “the supreme executive power and
authority”—in the singular—in a governor.75 The state constitution
then granted a series of powers similar to those in the federal
Constitution. The governor was to be commander in chief of the militia
and admiral of the navy, to have the power to convene the assembly
and senate on extraordinary occasions and prorogue them under

72. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 777, 781.
73. North Carolina’s 1776 constitution similarly provided that the governor “may exercise
all the other executive powers of government, limited and restrained as by this Constitution is
mentioned, and according to the laws of the State.” N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX, reprinted in 5
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 2787, 2791–92.
74. See Letter from George Read to John Dickinson (May 21, 1787), in WILLIAM
THOMPSON READ, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF GEORGE READ 443, (Phila., J.B. Lippincott
& Co. 1870) (noting that some of the “principal features” of a draft plan for the federal
constitution “are taken from the New York system of government”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 67,
at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (comparing the national executive to
New York’s executive); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra passim (Alexander Hamilton) (same).
But see MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 18–19) (challenging the unique relevance of
New York’s constitution). Notably, Gouverneur Morris, likely the key drafter on the Committee
of Style and Arrangement in the federal Convention, id. (manuscript at 188, 207), actively
participated in drafting the New York state constitution in 1777 and was a member of the state’s
provincial congress that adopted it, id. (manuscript at 243).
75. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XVII, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 2623,
2632.
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specified conditions, and to grant reprieves and pardons.76 It then made
it his duty:
to inform the legislature . . . of the condition of the State . . . ; to
recommend such matters to their consideration as shall appear to him
to concern its good government, welfare, and prosperity; to
correspond with the Continental Congress, and other States; to
transact all necessary business with the officers of government . . . ; to
take care that the laws are faithfully executed to the best of his ability;
and to expedite all such measures as may be resolved upon by the
legislature.77

After the state constitution was adopted, the provincial congress
and executive committees referred to these powers as a whole as
“executive powers.” For example, in response to a letter from a
committee in Albany, the statewide Council of Safety wrote via its
secretary, “I am directed to acquaint you that since the Governor has
been qualified, the executive powers of the State are vested in him by
the constitution; therefore, that to him alone all applications respecting
the militia should be made.”78 In response to a letter from George
Washington requesting that Governor George Clinton command the
militia in four New York counties, the Council stated that as Clinton
was now in charge of the militia under the new constitution, it would
be unnecessary to make a resolution granting him such power: “On the
Governor’s admission to office, all the executive powers of the State
are to be surrendered by the Council to him, and of consequence they
can neither alter the nature of those powers or place them in any other
hands.”79 The use of “executive powers” in the plural to refer to the
command of the militia suggests a broader use of the term
“executive.”80
This reading is consistent with the use of the term “executive
powers,” in the plural, in other Founding-era writings. If Madison’s

76. Id. art. XVIII, at 2632–33.
77. Id. art. XIX, at 2633.
78. 1 JOURNALS OF THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS, PROVINCIAL CONVENTION, COMMITTEE
OF SAFETY AND COUNCIL OF SAFETY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK: 1775-1776-1777, at 1025
(Albany, Thurlow Weed 1842). To the author’s knowledge, this Article is the first to examine the
records of the New York provincial congresses and committees for this purpose.
79. Id. at 1014–15.
80. To be sure, the militias of the time could be used to help carry law into execution. See,
e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (granting Congress power to provide for calling for the militia
to “execute the Laws of the Union,” among other things). The use of the term militia in the above
context, however, seems clearly to refer to its military function.
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notes to the Constitutional Convention are accurate, then Charles
Pinckney “was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive
powers of ⟨the existing⟩81 Congress might extend to peace & war [etc.]
which would render the Executive a Monarchy.”82 And in any event,
these notes show Madison’s use of “executive powers” to describe this
view, which would also be evidence of the proposition. And John Jay,
who would be instrumental in early foreign policy matters, wrote in a
1789 letter that the president “is vested with Powers and Prerogatives
of far greater Magnitude and Importance, than any that were confided
to the former Presidents of Congress . . . to whom the great executive
Powers were not committed; for they were all held and exercised by
the Congress itself.”83 These usages suggest not only that “executive
powers” encompassed a broad understanding of “executive,” but also
that the term was at least sometimes understood to include the
executive prerogatives generally.
The best conclusion to draw from these state constitutional
provisions and other Founding-era material is that, at the time of the
Founding, “executive powers,” in the plural, was sometimes used to
describe the entire suite of the traditional royal authorities. This makes
some sense because once these other powers are assigned to the
executive, they become executive (adjective) by virtue of the executive
(noun) possessing them. Thus, “executive powers” could be loosely
translated as “the executive’s powers.”84 But all of these powers were
subject to the laws, suggesting that no indefeasible prerogative power
could be exercised by the chief executive except as specifically
provided for in the state constitution. Therefore, when the term “the
executive power” was used, it is unlikely that it referred to a set of
unenumerated prerogative powers uncontrollable by the legislature.
Indeed, when the authors of the state constitutions clearly indicated
that the “executive powers” included the suite of other prerogatives,
they used the plural and, again, indicated that they were subject to law.
“The executive power,” in the singular, may still have been only the
power to carry law into execution. There is no suggestion in the New

81. As explained in FARRAND, supra note 19, at xvi–xix, pairs of angle brackets enclose
material that Madison added later in life as he prepared his notes of the convention for
posthumous publication.
82. Id. at 64–65.
83. Letter from John Jay, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Giuseppe Chiappe, Agent of the U.S.
at Mogador (Dec. 1, 1789), in 5 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 168, 169 (Elizabeth M.
Nuxoll ed., 2017).
84. I thank Matthew Steilen for suggesting this nice formulation.
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York Constitution or in the similar Pennsylvania Constitution85 that
the vesting of “the executive power,” in the singular, included all of the
royal prerogative powers.86
3. Hamilton as Pacificus. Alexander Hamilton himself recognized
the plausibility of both the residual vesting and law-execution readings
of the term “the executive power.” He appealed to both possibilities in
his debate with Madison over the Neutrality Proclamation, by which
President Washington declared the country’s neutrality vis-à-vis
France and England in 1793.87 Hamilton’s discussion of “the executive
power” is a staple of the executive power literature and the existing
debate, and he is often believed to have been the first to articulate the
residual reading of the clause.88
Hamilton’s first justification for the Neutrality Proclamation was
that the president “is charged with the Execution of the Laws, of which
Treaties form a part,” and he must therefore interpret existing treaties

85. The 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution provided that “[t]he supreme executive power shall
be vested in a president and council,” PA. CONST. of 1776, § 3, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 70, at 3081, 3084, and in its twentieth section provided that the president and council
“shall have power to appoint” officers “agreeable to this frame of government, and the laws that
may be made hereafter”; to fill vacancies; “to correspond with other states, and transact business
with the officers of government, civil and military; . . . to prepare such business as may appear to
them necessary to lay before the general assembly”; to hear impeachments; and to grant pardons,
id. § 20, at 3087. They were “to take care that the laws be faithfully executed” and “to expedite
the execution of such measures as may be resolved upon by the general assembly.” Id. § 20, at
3088. They could draw appropriated sums, lay temporary embargoes during the legislative recess,
and call together the general assembly. Id. “The president shall be commander in chief of the
forces of the state . . . .” Id.
86. The Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions did not grant “the executive
power” or “executive powers.” They simply declared that there shall be a supreme executive
magistrate and listed a variety of authorities. MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. II, § I, reprinted in 3
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 1888, 1899–1903; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. 2, §§ XLI–LIX,
reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 2471, 2481–84. South Carolina’s obliquely
provided that “the executive authority be vested in the president and commander-in-chief, limited
and restrained as aforesaid.” S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXX, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 70, at 3241, 3247. New Jersey’s provided that the governor “shall have the supreme executive
power, be Chancellor of the Colony, and act as captain-general and commander in chief of all the
militia, and other military force in this Colony.” N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII, reprinted in 5
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 2594, 2596. Rhode Island and Connecticut continued to be
governed by their seventeenth-century charters. See 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 529, 536
(recording no governing constitutional replacements or amendments for Connecticut between
1662 and 1818); 6 id. at 3211, 3222 (recording no intervening constitutional amendments or
replacements for Rhode Island between 1663 and 1842).
87. For more on the Neutrality Proclamation, see infra Part IV.B.1.
88. Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1172; Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8,
at 679–84; Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 330, 334–39.

WURMAN IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20_FIXED CHART (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

IN SEARCH OF PREROGATIVE

9/22/2020 3:13 PM

119

(and determine if they are even in force).89 He went on to say that
“[t]he President is the constitutional EXECUTOR of the laws. Our
Treaties and the laws of Nations form a part of the law of the land. He
who is to execute the laws must first judge for himself of their
meaning.”90 As Professor Harrison writes, here Hamilton “realized
that some of his readers might take the Whig view” of executive
power.91
Yet Hamilton also offered the alternative, residual view: “The
general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the EXECUTIVE
POWER of the Nation is vested in the President; subject only to the
exceptions and qu[a]lifications which are expressed in the
instrument.”92 And he includes the power of declaring war to be one
such qualification,93 thereby going beyond the law-execution reading.
Hamilton, in other words, provides support for both readings of “the
executive power.” This suggests that the residual vesting thesis—
supported also by the terminology of Montesquieu and the Essex
Result—was certainly a possible reading at the Founding. But
Hamilton’s dual analysis also suggests that the residual vesting thesis
“was less central to Hamilton’s analysis than proponents of the [t]hesis
typically acknowledge.”94
B. “The Executive Power” in Blackstone
Again, examining the variety of sources available to the Founding
generation suggests some ambiguity in the term “the executive power,”
particularly as it was used in the eighteenth century. Even so, the lawexecution reading seems to have more support. This Section examines
Blackstone’s text—which will be relevant to several parts of the
argument to come—and shows that even Blackstone seems to use “the
executive power” in both senses in dispute.
In his two chapters on the royal prerogative, Blackstone divides
the king’s prerogative powers into three categories: the king’s “royal
character,” his “royal authority,” and his “royal income.”95 In the
89. PACIFICUS, supra note 68, at 11.
90. Id. at 16.
91. Harrison, supra note 20, at 50.
92. PACIFICUS, supra note 68, at 13 (alteration in original).
93. Id.
94. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8, at 682.
95. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 233 (“These substantive or direct prerogatives
may . . . be divided into three kinds: being such as regard, first, the king’s royal character; secondly,
his royal authority; and, lastly, his royal income.”).
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second of these two chapters, Blackstone deals entirely with the king’s
royal revenue.96 The first deals with the king’s royal character, or
“dignity,” and the royal authority, or “power.”97
Blackstone begins with the royal “dignity,” under which he
includes the king’s attributes of sovereignty, sovereign immunity
(immunity from suit), and perpetuity.98 Then, Blackstone turns to the
second part of the king’s prerogatives. “We are next to consider those
branches of the royal prerogative,” Blackstone writes, “which invest
. . . our sovereign lord . . . with a number of authorities and powers; in
the exertion whereof consists the executive part of government.”99
Here, Blackstone describes powers that almost all appear somewhere
in the Constitution.
These powers deal either with “th[e] nation’s intercourse with
foreign nations, or it’s100 own domestic government and civil polity.”101
The former category includes the powers to send and receive
ambassadors; to make treaties, leagues, and alliances; to make war and
peace; to issue letters of marque and reprisal; to grant safe conduct in
times of conflict; and to admit strangers (foreigners) into the country.102
The latter, domestic powers include the power to veto legislation; be
commander in chief (or “generalissimo”); raise and regulate fleets and
armies; and erect forts and similar buildings.103 The king is also “the
fountain of honour, of office, and of privilege,” by which he may, for
example, grant titles of nobility.104 This includes the power to create
and dispose of offices and to naturalize aliens and erect corporations.105
The king is the arbiter of commerce, regulates weights and measures,
and may coin money.106 He is also the head of the Church of England.107
As Blackstone continues, he seems to use “the executive power”
in both senses in dispute. On the one hand, Blackstone gets to law
execution as he further discusses the king’s prerogatives. He writes that

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 271.
Id. at 233–34.
Id. at 234–42.
Id. at 242.
For a comment regarding the possessive use of “it’s,” see supra note 12.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 245.
Id. at 245–53.
Id. at 253–57.
Id. at 261–62.
Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 263–68.
Id. at 269.
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the king is “the fountain of justice and general conservator of the peace
of the kingdom.”108 This means the king is “the proper person to
prosecute for all public offenses and breaches of the peace,” may grant
pardons, and may nominate judges.109 The king has the power to make
proclamations as to “the manner, time, and circumstances of putting
[the] laws in execution.”110 Tellingly, Blackstone goes on to write that
the king may create judicial tribunals, “for, though the constitution of
the kingdom hath entrusted him with the whole executive power of the
laws, it is impossible, as well as improper, that he should personally
carry into execution this great and extensive trust,” and so “courts
should be erected, to assist him in executing this power.”111 Blackstone
seems to use the phrase “the executive power of the laws” as the power
to execute the laws enacted by the kingdom’s legislative body. Here,
“the executive power” is a subset of the numerous “authorities and
powers” that Blackstone promised to describe.
On the other hand, at the end of this entire discussion, Blackstone
writes: “[The preceding chapter] considered at large those branches of
the king’s prerogative, which contribute to his royal dignity, and
constitute the executive power of the government.”112 This seems to
suggest that all of the prerogative powers—save for those involving the
royal dignity or the royal revenue—constitute “the executive power.”
Professor Mortenson claims that the use here may refer to the
executive authority—that is, the king himself.113 This is possible, but
the executive authority also is responsible for the two other branches
of prerogative (the royal dignity and revenue). Thus, “the executive
power” here may instead refer to all the “powers and authorities” that
Blackstone discusses between his analyses of the royal character and
the royal revenue.
Blackstone’s use of “executive power,” in short, is cause for some
pause. Although the evidence, put together, does strongly favor the
law-execution reading, it is at least possible that by Blackstone’s time
the phrase could have also referred to all the royal powers and
authorities, save for those involving the royal dignity and revenue.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 257.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 257 (emphasis added).
Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1249 n.343.
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II. “THE EXECUTIVE POWER” IN CONVENTION
This Part seeks to show that, notwithstanding any ambiguity from
the textual sources canvassed in Part I, the proceedings at the
Constitutional Convention make the law-execution reading much
more plausible than the residual reading. Part II.A confirms
Blackstone’s influence on the drafting of the Constitution, which
contains almost all of the power and authorities attributed to the king
by Blackstone. At the very least, this confirms that defining and
assigning the known royal prerogatives to the various branches of
government was a central motivation of the Framers, and Blackstone
was a leading expositor of those prerogatives. Not only does this
confirm the influence of prerogative, but it suggests a reason to
discount the residual vesting thesis: if the delegates thought they were
already accounting for all of the royal powers, it seems unlikely they
would have thought they needed to grant a residuary of executive
powers. Part II.B analyzes the few prerogatives mentioned in
Blackstone but not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution and argues that
these omissions also suggest that it is unlikely the drafters understood
themselves to be creating a residual grant of prerogative power. Part
II.C details the Convention’s resolutions and the silence of the
ratification debates, both of which further support the law-execution
reading. Part II.D reexamines the three vesting clauses and proposes
that they make the most sense if “the executive power” indeed refers
only to law execution. Part II.E summarizes.
A. Distributing Prerogative Powers
A comparison of Blackstone’s chapter on the king’s powers and
authorities and the U.S. Constitution leaves little doubt that
Blackstone influenced the form the Constitution took. Almost every
single prerogative discussed is specifically assigned somewhere in the
Constitution114: to send ambassadors (president and Senate);115 to
receive ambassadors (president);116 to make treaties, leagues, and
alliances (president and Senate);117 to make war and peace (Congress

114. Compare supra notes 101–07 and accompanying text, with infra notes 115–29 and
accompanying text.
115. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[A]nd he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . . .”).
116. Id. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers . . . .”).
117. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).
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has the power to declare war, the president to wage it);118 to issue letters
of marque and reprisal (Congress);119 to veto legislation (president
subject to override);120 to be commander in chief (president);121 to raise
and regulate fleets and armies (Congress);122 to erect forts and similar
buildings (Congress);123 to grant titles of nobility (specifically
forbidden);124 to naturalize aliens (Congress);125 to create offices
(Congress);126 to regulate commerce and weights and measures, and to

118. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War . . . .”); id.
art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States . . . .”).
119. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To . . . grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water . . . .”).
120. The veto power and its override are delineated as follows:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House
of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect,
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds
of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations
prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
121. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service
of the United States . . . .”).
122. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12–14 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To raise and support
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy; [and] To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces . . . .”).
123. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 17 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to exercise [exclusive]
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the
Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful
Buildings . . . .”).
124. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States . . . .”).
125. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish an uniform Rule
of Naturalization . . . .”).
126. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (noting that offices are “established by Law”); see also id. art. I, § 8,
cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers.”).
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coin money (Congress);127 to institute judicial tribunals (Congress);128
and to nominate and appoint judges (president and Senate).129
If the Framers assigned all or nearly all of the known prerogative
powers, it is not clear why any of them would have thought it necessary
to create a residual grant of powers. The most serious objection to this
observation is that many foreign affairs powers are nonetheless
missing. Yet Blackstone himself wrote that the king had all of the
foreign affairs powers but then numbered among the king’s relevant
prerogatives—he called them the “principal” prerogatives relating to
foreign intercourse130—only those that also happened to find their way
into the Constitution.
More still, the delegates in the Constitutional Convention likely
did not think these powers were missing. As the delegates were
debating the Committee of Detail draft, which gave the Senate the
power over treaties and ambassadorial appointments,131 Charles
Pinckney observed that “the Senate is to have the power of making
treaties & managing our foreign affairs.”132 He later opposed giving the
House a say in the decision to “make war,” stating that “[t]he Senate
would be the best depositary” of this power, “being more acquainted
with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions.”133 Earlier
in the proceedings, James Wilson described the powers over foreign
commerce and war and peace to be the principal foreign affairs powers:
“Every nation attends to its foreign intercourse — to support its
commerce — to prevent foreign contempt and to make war and peace.
Our senate will be possessed of these powers, and therefore ought to
be dignified and permanent.”134 These two delegates seemed to believe

127. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3, 5 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; . . . To coin Money,
regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and
Measures . . . .”).
128. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 9 (“Congress shall have Power . . . To constitute Tribunals inferior to
the supreme Court . . . .”).
129. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of
the United States . . . .”).
130. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 253.
131. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 183 (“The Senate of the United States shall have power to
make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the supreme Court.”).
132. Id. at 235.
133. Id. at 318.
134. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 432–33 (reporting Yates’s notes). Madison recorded more
of Wilson’s explanation:
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that power over ambassadorial appointments, treaty making, war and
peace, and foreign commerce conveyed all the relevant foreign affairs
powers.
In fact, it appears that the power to make treaties may have
included the power to “treat” with foreign nations generally. The
Committee on Postponed Matters, for example, considered the
following resolution: “The Senate shall have power to treat with
foreign nations, but no Treaty shall be binding on the United States
which is not ratified by a Law.”135 At least in this formulation, the
power to make treaties was included within the power to “treat.”
Samuel Johnson’s 1755 dictionary defined “to treat” as “1. To
discourse; to make discussions . . . . 2. To practice negotiation . . . . 3.
To come to terms of accommodation . . . . 4. To make gratuitous
entertainments.”136 To treat therefore would include a general power
of “managing foreign affairs.” Of course, the ultimate power conferred
in the Constitution was to make treaties; but this requires the nation to
treat with other nations—that is, to engage in negotiations and general
discourse. The power to treat generally might thus be implicit in the
power to make treaties. Part IV revisits this issue in more detail, but
for now it suffices to say that by assigning and distributing the
“principal”137 foreign affairs prerogatives mentioned by Blackstone, it
appears the delegates thought they were sufficiently conferring all of
the relevant foreign affairs powers, eliminating the need for a residual
grant of power.
B. Two Key Omissions
There are, to be sure, still a few differences between Blackstone’s
list of prerogatives and those in the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution
does not make the president the head of any church. There was no
established church at the national level of the American constitutional
regime, and so such a power would have been unnecessary (not to
mention improper). There is no specific power in the U.S. Constitution
Every nation may be regarded in two relations 1 to its own citizens. 2 to foreign nations.
It is therefore not only liable to anarchy & tyranny within but has wars to avoid &
treaties to obtain from abroad. The Senate will probably be the depositary of the
powers concerning the latter objects. It ought therefore to be made respectable in the
eyes of foreign nations.
Id. at 425–26.
135. 2 id. at 382–83.
136. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2092 (London, W.
Strahan 1755).
137. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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over passports, but arguably regulating passports is necessary and
proper to carry into effect the naturalization power or the foreign
commerce power.138 The two key powers from Blackstone that seem to
be missing in the Constitution are the power to erect corporations and
the power over immigration (the power to admit strangers). This
Section explores the Framers’ likely views on these powers and
concludes that those views are inconsistent with a residual grant of
power.
1. The Power To Erect Corporations. As described above,139
Blackstone included the power to erect corporations as a prerogative
power. Because “the king has also the prerogative of conferring
privileges upon private persons,” he has “the prerogative of erecting
corporations; whereby a number of private persons are united and knit
together, and enjoy many liberties, powers, and immunities in their
politic capacity, which they were utterly incapable of in their
natural.”140 This power is nowhere found in the Constitution, and the
omission of it may help resolve the meaning of the grant of “the
executive power.”
The debate in the Convention over a power of incorporation was
short. It occurred on September 14,141 when the Constitution was
nearly in its final form.142 Benjamin Franklin moved to add a power in
Article I, Section 8 to allow Congress to “provide for cutting canals.”143
Madison then “suggested an enlargement of the motion into a power
‘to grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the U.S. might
138. As Justice Scalia explained,
The naturalization power also enables Congress to furnish the people it makes citizens
with papers verifying their citizenship—say a consular report of birth abroad (which
certifies citizenship of an American born outside the United States) or a passport
(which certifies citizenship for purposes of international travel). As the Necessary and
Proper Clause confirms, every congressional power “carries with it all those incidental
powers which are necessary to its complete and effectual execution.”
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1, 69 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 429 (1821)). The majority in Zivotofsky II
held that such a power belongs to the president by virtue of the Receptions Clause, see id. at 10–
13 (majority opinion), but that clause is framed as a duty (and quite a narrow one) and not a
power. For an argument that the passport power may be necessary and proper to the foreign
commerce power, see MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 227–28).
139. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
140. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 263.
141. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 612–20.
142. The final draft of the Constitution was adopted only three days later, on September 17.
Id. at 641–49.
143. See id. at 615.
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require & the legislative provisions of individual States may be
incompetent,’” with the primary objective being “to secure an easy
communication between the States which the free intercourse now to
be opened, seemed to call for.”144
Rufus King objected, arguing that “[t]he States will be prejudiced
and divided into parties by it—In Philada. & New York, It will be
referred to the establishment of a Bank, which has been a subject of
contention in those Cities. In other places it will be referred to
mercantile monopolies.”145 James Wilson responded that providing for
banks would probably not “excite the prejudices & parties
apprehended,” and that providing for mercantile monopolies was
already implied by the power to regulate trade (perhaps in
combination with the Necessary and Proper Clause).146 George Mason,
however, supported “limiting the power [of incorporation] to the single
case of Canals” because “[h]e was afraid of monopolies of every sort,
which he did not think were by any means already implied by the
Constitution as supposed by Mr. Wilson.”147
The motion was so modified to be limited only to the power to
incorporate companies for the cutting of canals and was rejected by a
vote of 8–3.148 Madison’s notes then state, “The other part fell of
course, as including the power rejected.”149 In other words, the general
power of incorporation was rejected because it would have included
the rejected power to incorporate companies for the purpose of cutting
canals and making other internal improvements.
Although this episode lends itself to more than one possible
inference, the most plausible is that the delegates intended to deny the
national government a power to grant charters of incorporation.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 616.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. Of course, recent scholarship shows that Madison appears to have revised his notes
of the Convention later in his life. MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 179 (2015) (“In the fall of 1789, Madison turned back to the
Notes. . . . As he composed the Notes after August 21, he may have recast his comments and
speeches. Madison also revised the Notes, adding and detailing procedural details.”); see supra
note 81. But in this case, there is no reason to doubt the sequence of events or the general concerns
of the delegates. Professor Bilder does not question this episode in her book when discussing how
it was later relied upon by Thomas Jefferson in the debate over incorporating a bank. BILDER,
supra, at 206–07. Additionally, James McHenry’s notes of the same day confirm that there were
two motions—one for cutting canals and the other a general incorporation power—and that the
incorporation power was rejected. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 620.

WURMAN IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20_FIXED CHART (DO NOT DELETE)

128

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/22/2020 3:13 PM

[Vol. 70:93

Wilson, to be sure, suggested that some power to incorporate may be
implied by other legislative powers, and so it could be that a power to
erect corporations was rejected as unnecessary. But Wilson did not
offer his suggestion as a reason to reject the proposal; he was arguing
in favor of it, and so it is reasonable to assume that the delegates who
voted to reject the proposal did so because they did not want the
national government to have any power to erect corporations at all.
And yet, to none of these delegates did it occur that such a power might
exist by virtue of Article II’s Vesting Clause.
This intent is at least suggestive of how the delegates understood
the meaning of “the executive power.” Notwithstanding their vote, if
the residual vesting thesis is correct, then such a power to erect
corporations was not merely implied, it was expressly granted by the
Executive Vesting Clause—and not a single delegate who wanted to
deny this power, whether or not they in fact constituted the majority,
sounded the alarm. Even Wilson had to infer such a power by
implication from specific grants of legislative power; it did not occur to
him, either, that such a power might belong to the executive.
2. The Immigration Prerogative. There was no debate in the
Convention over the power to admit foreigners. Blackstone described
such a power as a royal prerogative, but it appears nowhere in the
constitutional text. The exact location of the federal immigration
power is unclear and remains contested among originalist scholars.150
The clause about the Atlantic slave trade suggests that the delegates
believed the states would retain primary control over immigration, but
that Congress might override their decisions.151 The foreign commerce

150. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Does the Constitution Give the Federal Government Power over
Immigration?, CATO UNBOUND (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2018/09/12/ilyasomin/does-constitution-give-federal-government-power-over-immigration [https://perma.cc/
K9SE-KN98] (arguing there is no federal power over immigration); Christopher R. Green,
Tribes, Nations, States: Our Three Commerce Powers 26–27 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that the immigration power follows from Congress’s power
to regulate commerce “with” foreign nations).
151. The clause temporarily limited Congress’s ability to interfere with State discretion:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; see also MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 181) (“The wording
of the Slave Trade Clause . . . strongly suggests that the states were thought to have primary
authority over immigration, but that Congress has power to preempt state law and create a federal
legal regime.”).
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power may have permitted controlling the importation of slaves—and
the transporting of individuals152—but it hardly follows that Congress
can control generally who has a right to come to reside in the United
States for purposes other than trade.153 There may also be creative ways
to exercise the immigration power. For example, presumably the states
could cede a strip of territory along all United States borders to the
federal government, which could then control who crosses these
borders through its plenary power over the territories.154
Not only did the delegates therefore assume Congress or the states
would have the power over immigration, but they likely understood
that the immigration prerogative had fallen into disuse. As Professor
McConnell explains, “The last time a monarch had exercised the
prerogative to expel a class of foreigners was in 1575, under Elizabeth,
and according to most historians, ‘[t]his branch of the prerogative . . .
ha[d] been allowed to fall into desuetude, and may be regarded as no
longer existing.’”155 In 1792, the British government investigated
whether the monarch had authority to exclude thousands of refugees
from revolutionary France without parliamentary approval; the
conclusion was that the king had no power to exclude “alien friends”—
that is, foreigners from friendly countries.156 Congress apparently took
this same position during the debates over the Alien Acts in 1798. “No
one,” according to McConnell, “even suggested that [President]
Adams had inherent presidential authority to deport aliens from
countries not at war with the United States. This suggests that the

152. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 215–16 (1824) (holding that the transportation
of people is “commerce”).
153. In his interesting new paper, Professor Christopher Green argues quite persuasively that
the Framers understood commerce “with foreign nations” to encompass any commercial
interactions between American citizens and subjects of foreign states, wherever that commerce
occurs, and that this would include a power to control all foreigners present in the United States.
Green, supra note 150, at 6, 26–27. Green’s evidence is persuasive, and perhaps the power to
regulate every commercial interaction implies the ability to exclude and expel aliens, but the case
is not foolproof and in any event Congress’s power was controverted early on in the debate over
the Alien Enemies Act. See infra note 158.
154. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”). I first heard of this possibility at an
originalism works-in-progress conference hosted by the University of San Diego.
155. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 180) (alterations in original) (quoting H.S.Q.
HENRIQUES, THE LAW OF ALIENS AND NATURALIZATION 11 (1906)).
156. Id.
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founders did not share Blackstone’s more capacious interpretation of
executive authority on this point.”157
Putting these points together indicates the constitutional drafters
likely understood the royal immigration prerogative to be obsolete,
and they seem to have assumed Congress would have the power over
immigration. But on both points, there was ambiguity. As to the first,
the drafters’ key guide on executive power, Blackstone, described the
power over aliens as a royal prerogative. As to the second, they did not
expressly grant to Congress the power to exclude alien friends,158 if they
intended to grant such a power to the national government at all. Yet
if the Executive Vesting Clause is a residual grant of prerogative
powers, then it would be easy for future presidents to argue they had a
plenary immigration power. Indeed, in 1950, the Supreme Court held
that “[t]he exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty” that
“stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive
power to control the foreign affairs of the nation. When Congress
prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility of aliens, it is not
dealing alone with a legislative power. It is implementing an inherent
executive power.”159
It seems highly unlikely both that the delegates would have
intended to leave this possibility open and that they would have been
unaware of such a possibility if they had granted a residuum of royal
power to the executive. The Declaration of Independence had
complained that the king “has endeavored to prevent the population
of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for
Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their
migrations hither.”160 And they do not appear to have simply forgotten
about this issue at the Convention; in opposition to a motion to
157. Id.
158. Unless Professor Green is correct. See Green, supra note 150, at 26–27. Even if he is
correct that the power over commerce with foreign nations allows Congress to control every local
commercial interaction by aliens, the prerogative power, as described in Blackstone, was much
more explicit. See supra notes 102, 105 and accompanying text. Indeed, the lack of clarity in the
Constitution led very quickly to the federal immigration power being controverted in 1798. See,
e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798), res. 4, reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 131, 132 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“Resolved,
That alien friends are under the jurisdiction and protection of the laws of the state wherein they
are; that no power over them has been delegated to the United States . . . .”).
159. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (citations omitted);
see also MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 181) (“The modern Supreme Court, without
explanation, has assumed that the implied federal power over immigration is not only plenary but
virtually exclusive of the states.”).
160. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776).
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increase the residency requirement for a U.S. Senator to fourteen
years, for example, Oliver Ellsworth objected that he “was opposed to
the motion as discouraging meritorious aliens from emigrating to this
Country.”161 It is unlikely that they would have left such a power to the
president and that they would have been blind to this possibility under
a residual grant of power. Far more plausibly, the grant of “the
executive power” did not include a residuum of prerogative power at
all.
C. The Convention’s Instruction, and Ratification
The above arguments make a compelling case against a residual
grant of power, particularly when combined with several general
aspects of the Convention’s proceedings. The Virginia Plan would have
granted a national executive “general authority to execute the National
laws” as well as “the Executive rights vested in Congress by the
Confederation.”162 In the June 1 debate over this provision, several
delegates worried it would grant too much power to the national
executive. James Wilson, for example, said that he “did not consider
the prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining
the Executive powers” because some of them “were of a Legislative
nature,” such as “that of war & peace [etc.] The only powers he
conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and
appointing officers, not ⟨appertaining to and⟩ appointed by the
Legislature.”163 According to Rufus King’s notes, Wilson also argued
that “Extive. powers are designed for the execution of Laws, and
appointing Officers not otherwise to be appointed.”164
Madison defined “executive” power similarly, saying it was the
“power to carry into effect[] the national laws[,] to appoint to offices in
cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers”
not of a legislative or judicial nature “as may from time to time be
delegated by the national Legislature.”165 The last clause on delegated
power was struck as being included within the power to carry into
effect the national laws, and the motion then carried.166

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 235.
1 id. at 21; id. at 62–63.
Id. at 65–66.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 67.
Id.
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On the one hand, Professor Harrison concludes from all this that
the delegates intended to retain only the power to execute the laws
(and appoint officers not otherwise provided for) and to reject a
general grant of other “executive rights” in the president.167 Both
Wilson’s and Madison’s statements also support the proposition that
“executive” power was thought to be only the power to execute law
and to appoint necessary assistants. This view is also consistent with
Madison’s strategy to decide on the executive’s powers before
“determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a single
officer.”168 The ultimate adoption of a unitary, as opposed to plural,
executive with only power to execute the laws and limited other
prerogatives is consistent with the Convention’s instruction and the
discussion among the delegates.169
The residual vesting thesis, on the other hand, implies that the
Committee of Detail ignored the Convention’s instruction from June 1
and the spirit of the debate that occurred. That is exactly what
McConnell, for one, claims. According to him, the Convention decided
to vest in the president only the powers of “law execution, appointment
of offices other than judges, and a qualified veto.”170 “Undeterred,”
McConnell writes, “the Committee of Detail reinstated a vesting clause
at least as broad as the original Resolution Seven. It stated, ‘The
Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single
person.’ So much for preparing a draft ‘conformable’ to the
Convention’s decisions.”171
More still, not a single opponent of the Constitution over the
course of Ratification, including those who spoke about executive
power, so much as mentioned the possibility of a residual grant of
power. McConnell again recognizes the point, describes this silence as
a “significant dog that did not bark,” and recognizes that the “AntiFederalists did not apparently perceive the possibility that the Vesting

167. Harrison, supra note 20, at 37. Yates’ concise and otherwise unhelpful notes of the day
list only “[a] general authority to execute the laws” and “[t]o appoint all officers not otherwise
provided for” as executive powers “[a]greed to.” FARRAND, supra note 19, at 70.
168. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 67.
169. The delegates agreed to a unitary executive on July 17. 2 id. at 22.
170. Michael W. McConnell, James Wilson’s Contributions to the Construction of Article II,
17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 40 (2019).
171. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 185).
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Clause of Article II might convey unenumerated powers to the
President.”172
Consider the sheer amount of inconvenient facts that the
proponents of a residual grant of power must ignore. To maintain the
residual vesting thesis, they must believe that the Committee of Detail
ignored the Convention’s instruction; that none of the delegates
realized the possibility that a power to erect corporations, as a
prerogative power, would be vested in the president despite their
explicit vote to deny the national government that power; that none
was aware of the risk that a president might someday claim a
prerogative power over immigration; and that the silence of the AntiFederalists was an oversight instead of a clear indication that few at the
time understood “the executive power” to include a residual grant of
prerogatives.173 A reading of “the executive power” to mean only the
power to execute the laws is consistent with the Convention’s
instructions, with the delegates’ other votes, and with the AntiFederalists’ deafening silence.
D. The Vesting Clauses Reconsidered
The Constitution’s three vesting clauses make the most sense if
“the executive power” refers only to the power to execute law. The
legislative power, the executive power, and the judicial power each
refers to a single function: the power to make laws, the power to

172. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 75). Mortenson’s extensive research also has
not come up with any barking dogs:
Others have observed the failure of royal residuum theorists to identify even one
positive assertion of the claim during drafting or ratification. I’ve managed no better
on their behalf. Despite reviewing tens of thousands of pages of commentary from
hundreds of writers and speakers—and going to an abundance of caution to flag all
instances that even vaguely tickled my antennae for a second and third review with as
generous a mindset as could be mustered—I have been unable to find a single
statement that the Executive Power Clause contained a substantive residuum.
Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 90) (footnote omitted).
Mortenson also points out the total silence in the North Carolina ratifying convention when they
discussed “the executive power” clause; no one seemed to be at all bothered by it. Id. (manuscript
at 93). The concerns were all about the other powers granted to the president. Id.
173. To be sure, perhaps the Anti-Federalists did not sound the alarm because most of the
prerogatives had already been assigned away from the president or otherwise limited. That seems
rather unlikely, however, given the uncertainty surrounding the power to erect corporations and
the immigration prerogative, two important historic prerogative powers that would have been
familiar to the Anti-Federalists. If the Anti-Federalists had believed that the Executive Vesting
Clause included a residuum of prerogative powers, surely at least one of them would have realized
the risk that these two prerogatives might be thought to belong to the president.
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execute those laws, and the power to adjudicate disputes—at least
those affecting life, liberty, or property174—according to those laws.
This taxonomy is the only one that accounts for the variations in
the vesting clauses. Under the standard accounts, there is always
something odd about the different formulations. Article I vests all
legislative powers (plural) herein granted, and then has an
enumeration of power; Article II vests “the executive power,” with a
subsequent enumeration of additional powers; and Article III vests
“the judicial power” with an enumeration of the jurisdiction to which
that judicial power extends, but not an enumeration of judicial powers.
Under the residual vesting thesis, “the executive power” is a grant of
multiple, executive-type powers, yet “the judicial power” seems to be
a single function. The disconnect between Articles I and III is even
greater. If the enumeration of jurisdiction in Article III is analogous to
the enumeration in Article I, then it would have been more natural to
provide that “all judicial powers herein granted” are vested in the
courts, or conversely that “the legislative power shall be vested in
Congress,” with a subsequent enumeration of the subject matters to
which the legislative power “shall extend.”
The simplest and most likely answer is that “the judicial power” is
a single function, “the executive power” is a single function, and “the
legislative power” is a single function. Describing the function does
not, however, indicate when that function may be performed. Hence,
Article III enumerates the jurisdiction of the federal courts. “The
executive power” is similarly limited to executing whatever laws
Congress has enacted, and therefore is limited by the enumeration of
power in Article I, Section 8. Unlike the judiciary, which has only the
judicial power, and unlike the executive, which has only “the executive
power” and a few other specifically enumerated powers traditionally
associated with the executive authority, the Convention arguably
assigned Congress much more than just “the legislative power.”

174. The “core” or “exclusive” judicial power—the power that only judges could exercise—
was the adjudication of disputes that led to such deprivations of private rights. Public rights cases,
in contrast, could be adjudicated either by the courts or one of the other two branches of
government. See Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284
(1856) (distinguishing between matters which are “the subject of a suit at the common law, or in
equity, or admiralty,” which must be exercised by courts, and those “involving public rights,”
which are amenable to judicial resolution “but which congress may or may not bring within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper”); William Baude,
Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515–16, 1516 n.9 (2020) (noting
historical exceptions to the power of the judiciary to adjudicate disputes).
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Congress, that is to say, does a lot more than just make laws. In
fact, it received most of the historic prerogative powers, like declaring
war. Yet “declaring war” is not making law—it does not prescribe a
rule of civil conduct. Neither is borrowing or coining money, or issuing
letters of marque, for that matter. Thus, the drafters had to give some
indication that Congress was getting significantly more power than
simply “the legislative power.”175 To be sure, Congress can often
exercise these powers by making laws—that is, by making general rules
that prescribe the conduct of private individuals or executive officials.
But Congress can also exercise such powers by joint resolution.176 It can
in this way issue a declaration of war or a letter of marque, neither of
which can be described as a “law.”
The Vesting Clause of Article I was a natural way for the drafters
to indicate this expansion: “All legislative powers herein granted shall
be” vested in Congress. Not just “the legislative power,” and not “only
such legislative powers as are herein granted,” which would have been
a more natural formulation to signal a limitation and enumeration of
power. The Article I Vesting Clause, in other words, might indicate a
defined and limited scope of legislative powers; but it appears to have
also been a signal that the Constitution was expanding the powers of
the legislative branch beyond a baseline grant of “the” legislative
power.
To be sure, this analysis depends on a perhaps too narrow
definition of “the legislative power” as the power to create rules of civil
conduct.177 “The legislative power” could be understood more broadly

175. This is not to suggest that these powers could not have been considered legislative even
when they belonged to the executive. After all, the executive historically had some legislative
power, namely the veto. Recall also that Wilson argued in Convention that the powers of war and
peace were “legislative.” FARRAND, supra note 19, at 65–66. Congress could also make laws with
respect to any of these prerogatives, for example by authorizing the executive to issue letters of
marque or to borrow money. The point is only that it is not obvious that these prerogatives
required the making of laws or that they were in their nature legislative; they all went under the
label “prerogative” and historically belonged to the king. It therefore makes some sense that the
delegates, when assigning these powers to the legislature, would emphasize the point by vesting
all legislative powers in Congress.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
177. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 74, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (defining
the legislative power as the power “to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society”); Larry
Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly
Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1310–17 (2003) (canvassing similar statements from Locke,
Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Founding-era sources to support a definition of legislative power
similar to that of Hamilton).
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as the power to create and change legal relations.178 A declaration of
war and a letter of marque fall squarely within this broader definition.
For example, a letter of marque changes the rules of civil conduct by
authorizing the private capturing of enemy merchant vessels. Although
this may be right, it was nevertheless disputed at the Convention
whether certain prerogative powers were more legislative or executive
in nature.179 Specifically designating these prerogatives as legislative
“powers” was a good way to signal a position on the question.
Treating each of the three major powers as a single function is not
only logical, it appears to be the way Gouverneur Morris, the head of
the Committee of Style, and who might have even worked on the
constitutional draft mostly alone,180 used the terms. In support of a
Council of Revision, and responding to objections about blending
powers, Morris (according to Madison) described “the three powers”
as “the power of making[,] . . . of executing, and . . . of judging, the
laws.”181 This taxonomy also has support in other Founding-era sources
when the three powers were discussed together. For example,
Montesquieu wrote, “All would be lost if the same man or the same
body of principal men . . . exercised these three powers: that of making
the laws, that of executing public resolutions, and that of judging the
crimes or the disputes of individuals.”182 In an encomium to the
inhabitants of Quebec and the separation of powers, the delegates to
the Continental Congress in 1774 wrote of the Quebecois that their
governor was “vested with the executive powers, or the powers of
administration,” in the governor and council was “lodged the power of
making laws,” and their judges were “to decide every cause affecting
your lives, liberty or property.”183
In conclusion, it seems likely that the Constitution deploys each
power in the sense of its single function: the power to make law,
execute law, and adjudicate disputes—at least those affecting life,

178. I am grateful to Professor Harrison for pointing out this possibility to me.
179. See supra note 46 (describing statements from James Wilson).
180. THACH, JR., supra note 10, at 138.
181. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 79.
182. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 49, at 157.
183. Letter from the Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec (Oct.
26, 1774), in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 104, 110 (1904). I am indebted to
Professor Mortenson for this reference. See Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7
(manuscript at 66–67).
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liberty, and property—under the law. That is how Founding-era
sources used the terms.184
E. Summary
Part I demonstrated that the textual meaning of “the executive
power” is ambiguous but tends to support the law-execution reading.
Part II offered a more comprehensive argument that the residual
vesting thesis is implausible based on the proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention, the delegates’ likely views, and the silence
of the Anti-Federalists. A law-execution reading of “the executive
power” better fits these data—as well as the variations in the
Constitution’s three vesting clauses.
Yet, a “thin” law-execution account of “the executive power” is
possibly inconsistent with historical practice and Founding-era debates
in both the domestic sphere and foreign affairs. If “the executive
power” means only the power to carry into execution preexisting law
and is entirely defeasible, then Congress can legislate on how the laws
are to be executed in all possible detail. Congress could specify what
officers shall prosecute offenses and enforce the laws, on what
conditions they may be removed, and what the president’s role is with
respect to these other officers. A thin law-execution reading of “the
executive power,” in combination with the president’s foreign affairsrelated powers, may also be insufficient to explain the president’s
power to instruct and recall ambassadors, as well as other presidential
foreign affairs powers.
Parts III and IV look to historical practice to put forward a new,
“thick” law-execution account of “the executive power” vested in the
president. This power is the power to execute law, but it includes within
it certain incidental, derivative, or component powers that more easily
explain much of the historical practice.

184. Professor Mortenson agrees with this assessment of the evidence: “The defining role of
the legislature was promulgating law. The defining role of the judiciary was adjudicating law. And
the defining role of the President was executing law.” Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra
note 7 (manuscript at 42); see also id. (manuscript at 48) (“Eighteenth-century dictionaries, legal
treatises, political theory tracts, caselaw, politicians, clergymen, and pamphleteers all agreed that
the phrase ‘executive power’ meant something quite simple: ‘the power of putting in execution.’”
(quoting Executive Power, A POCKET DICTIONARY (London, J. Newbery 3d ed. 1765))).

WURMAN IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20_FIXED CHART (DO NOT DELETE)

138

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/22/2020 3:13 PM

[Vol. 70:93

III. DOMESTIC SEPARATION OF POWERS DISPUTES
This Part examines a number of domestic separation of powers
practices and debates from the Founding era onward to show they are
consistent with a thick understanding of “the executive power” to
execute law. Part III.A starts with appointments and removals,
revisiting the famous “Decision of 1789” to show that a presidential
removal power can be consistent with the law-execution reading of
“the executive power.” Part III.B assesses presidential control over
prosecution. Part III.C then examines the prerogative proclamation
power and its implications for administrative regulations and the Steel
Seizure Case. The real issue in that case was not whether the president
had some “emergency” or “inherent” power to seize the steel mills; it
was whether the president was properly exercising a “proclamation”
power to help carry into execution existing laws or was engaging in new
lawmaking. Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence was a distraction
from the case’s true controversy. The upshot of this Part is that the
president may have more indefeasible power in the domestic sphere as
part of “the executive power” than proponents of the “thin” lawexecution or cross-reference readings have claimed.
A. Appointments, Removals, and Presidential Administration
It is best not to reinvent the wheel. Professor Mortenson himself
agrees that “the executive power,” on the thin understanding of law
execution, included the power to have “assistances.” “George Mason
was in good company,” writes Mortenson, “in considering ‘the
appointment of publick officers’ closely linked to the executive
power—sometimes as a strict conceptual element of the thing itself,
other times more loosely as an indispensable buttress for its meaningful
exercise.”185 “This view of appointments as ‘executive’” even under the
narrower reading “drew on a longstanding (though not uncontested)
strand of Anglo-American legal thought.”186 Mortenson draws on
sources from pre-revolutionary America:
This view of the relationship between appointments and execution
influenced thinking in the Americas well before the Founding. In a
1771 Virginia dispute about appointments authority, for example, the
185. Id. (manuscript at 58) (footnote omitted) (quoting George Mason, George Mason’s
Objections to the Constitution, MASS. CENTINEL, Nov. 21, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 287, 289 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986)).
186. Id.
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winning counsel argued that “wherever an act of Parliament or of
Assembly erects a new office, without prescribing the particular mode
of appointing the officer, it belongs to the King to make the
appointment.” Counsel’s explanation is key: the proposed canon of
construction followed necessarily from the King’s executive power.
“[P]ossessing the executive power of the laws,” it is the King’s
“peculiar duty to see such act carried into execution, which cannot be
unless an officer is appointed.” That in turn[] implied that “[i]f then
our acts of Assembly, erecting [an office] have not said by whom the
nomination shall be, it will follow that the King, who is to see the law
executed, must nominate persons for that purpose.”187

James Wilson adhered to this view in the Constitutional
Convention, arguing that “[g]ood laws are of no effect without a good
Executive; and there can be no good Executive without a responsible
appointment of officers to execute.”188 Mortenson concludes that
although there were some objectors, “most Americans who spoke to
the point seemed to conclude that the right to appoint ‘assistances’ in
execution was necessary on any functional understanding of the power
to execute.”189 Thus, Mortenson argues that when the term “executive
powers” was used in the plural, it could have referred also to the
component power to appoint officers for the purpose of assisting in law
execution.190
Although Mortenson does not discuss Blackstone in this regard,
Blackstone’s chapter on the king’s powers and authorities is consistent
with this view. Blackstone wrote that the king has “the right of erecting
courts of judicature” because although “the constitution of the
kingdom hath entrusted him with the whole executive power of the
laws, it is impossible, as well as improper, that he should personally
carry into execution this great and extensive trust,” and thus it was
“necessary, that courts should be erected, to assist him in executing this
power.”191 Although Blackstone did not fully disentangle the executive
and judicial powers here, he understood that the chief executive could

187. Id. at 59 (second alteration added) (quoting Godwin v. Lunan, Jeff. Va. Rep. 96, 105
(Gen. Ct. Va. 1771), reprinted in 1 VIRGINIA REPORTS, JEFFERSON—33 GRATTAN 52, 56–57
(1903)).
188. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 538–39.
189. Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 62).
190. Id. (manuscript at 66). Of course, as explained above, many state constitutions used the
plural “executive powers” to describe other executive prerogatives, such as the pardon power.
See supra Part I.A.2.
191. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 257.
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not “personally carry into execution” “the executive power of the
laws” and thus required other officers to “assist” in “executing this
power.”
Even so, some appointment power can be assigned away from the
chief executive, as counsel in the 1771 case from Virginia noted.192
Madison and Wilson generalized the point in the Constitutional
Convention, arguing that the “extent of the Executive authority” was
the “power to carry into effect[] the national laws” and “to appoint to
offices in cases not otherwise provided for.”193 Ultimately, the
Constitution requires senatorial advice and consent for all principal
officers, and leaves it up to Congress to decide whether other officers
should be appointed by that mode or by the president alone, the heads
of departments, or the courts of law.194 Thus, the Constitution
distributes some of this “executive power” to carry law into execution
to both the Senate and Congress.195 Indeed, the president is left with no
unilateral appointment power at all unless Congress chooses to
redelegate that power for the appointment of inferior officers.
The famous debate in the First Congress over the power to remove
executive officers may now be put in a new light. The Constitution, as
just noted, assigns part of the appointment power away from the
president, but it does not say anything at all about removal. When the
delegates were establishing the first departments of the national
government, the question arose whether the departments’ principal
officers had to be removed by the president with the advice and
consent of the Senate; whether the Constitution vested that power in
the president alone; or whether Congress in its discretion could

192. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
193. See FARRAND, supra note 19, at 67 (reporting Wilson’s second of Madison’s proposal);
id. at 70 (noting Wilson’s independent argument that “Extive. powers are designed for the
execution of Laws, and appointing Officers not otherwise to be appointed”).
194. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
195. This raises some interesting questions about whether Congress may circumscribe whom
the president may appoint to certain positions or whether that power remains in the president.
My initial thought is that the greater power to vest the power of appointment in the president
alone, the heads of departments, or the courts of law includes a lesser power to specify the types
of individuals who may be appointed—for example, those “learned in the law.” See 28 U.S.C. §
505 (2018) (establishing the requirement for the solicitor general). This would not, however, apply
to officers appointed by and with advice and consent (such as the solicitor general), and so the
requirement of § 505 may be unconstitutional. The Senate could of course insist on any
qualifications that it wanted. It is important to note that whatever the answer to this question is—
whatever “appointment power” is left to the president—that power would be the same under the
residual vesting thesis as it would be under the reading of “the executive power” presented here.
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delegate that power to the president alone.196 Madison first argued that
“the executive power” was vested in the president, but that the
Constitution had assigned some of that power to the Senate:
The Constitution affirms, that the Executive power shall be vested in
the President. Are there exceptions to this proposition? Yes, there
are. The Constitution says, that in appointing to office, the Senate
shall be associated with the President, unless in the case of inferior
officers . . . . Have we a right to extend this exception? I believe not.197

Madison thus argued that all of “the executive power” not
assigned away from the president belonged to the president. The
question according to Madison, then, was: “Is the power of displacing,
an Executive power? . . . [I]f any power whatsoever is in its nature
Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling
those who execute the laws.”198 “[I]f any thing in its nature is
executive,” Madison added later on, “it must be that power which is
employed in superintending and seeing that the laws are faithfully
executed.”199
Representative Fisher Ames agreed with Madison. “The
Constitution places all Executive power in the hands of the President,”
exhorted Ames, “and could he personally execute all the laws, there
would be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries; but the circumscribed
powers of human nature in one man, demand the aid of others.”200
Because the president cannot possibly handle all the minutiae of
administration, he “must therefore have assistants.”201 “But in order
that he may be responsible to his country,” Ames concluded, “he must
have a choice in selecting his assistants, a control over them, with
power to remove them when he finds the qualifications which induced
their appointment cease to exist.”202 “The executive power” thus

196. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 381, 484 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Also, some
representatives argued that impeachment was the only mode of removing officers—an argument
that was not seriously advanced because, as Madison pointed out, impeachment is a method by
which Congress can remove officers. It says nothing of the president’s power. Id. at 374–75.
197. Id. at 461, 463. As Madison said subsequently, “[T]he Executive power shall be vested in
a President of the United States. The association of the Senate with the President in exercising
that particular function, is an exception to this general rule; and exceptions to general rules, I
conceive, are ever to be taken strictly.” Id. at 496.
198. Id. at 463.
199. Id. at 500.
200. Id. at 474.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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includes, according to Ames, a power for the president to remove his
assistants.
Madison’s and Ames’s arguments are consistent with the lawexecution view of “the executive power.” There is no indication in the
debates that anyone in Congress understood them to be referring to
the entire suite of royal authorities when they said “the executive
power.”203 The discussion is entirely in the context of “appointing,
overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.”204 Their
arguments are evidence that the Founding generation shared a “thick”
view of “the executive power,” with which a presidential power to
remove principal executive officers is consistent; a residual grant of
executive powers is simply not necessary for the argument.205
203. As Professors Bradley and Flaherty note,
Instead of seeing the Vesting Clause as conveying a package of foreign affairs powers,
the House members who invoked the Clause may have simply believed that the Clause
gave the President a general power to execute the laws, and that removal of
subordinate executive officers was included within such a power.
Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8, at 661.
204. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
205. In a recent paper, Professor Daniel Birk argues on historical grounds that removal is not
part of “the executive power” because the king did not in fact have an inherent removal power.
Daniel D. Birk, Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive, 73 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428737 [https://perma.cc/
Q6YD-2MKX]. For a number of reasons, however, Professor Birk’s evidence does not contradict
the account presented here.
First, many of Professor Birk’s examples of non-removable principal officers are lifelong,
hereditary officeholders from as early as the fourteenth century and running through the
seventeenth century, when offices were considered to be personal property and where the
granting of such tenures was entirely up to the king. See id. (manuscript at 21–25). But it is not at
all clear that much of this survived into the late eighteenth century, and there is no reason to
believe such examples provide any insight into the meaning of a constitution rooted in popular
sovereignty. It is not particularly revealing that James I appointed Francis Bacon as his attorney
general for life. Contra id. (manuscript at 22–23) (holding out Bacon’s tenure as “reveal[ing] an
executive apparatus far removed in many respects from the assumptions of unity often projected
onto it by modern scholars”). Moreover, Blackstone certainly argued that principal officers were
entirely under the control of the king. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 327 (“[H]is majesty’s
great officers of state, the lord treasurer, lord chamberlain, the principal secretaries, or the like[,
are not] . . . in that capacity in any considerable degree the objects of our laws . . . .”). Nor does it
matter that in these early centuries Parliament tried to regulate tenure to ameliorate the situation
of hereditary and lifetime tenures. Contra Birk, supra (manuscript at 34–36) (emphasizing
“Parliament’s longstanding desire to keep the king’s officers accountable”). Indeed, in the
eighteenth century, most of Parliament’s relevant statutes converted life-tenured offices into
offices removable at will. See id. (manuscript at 35).
Second, many of the paper’s examples involve officers exercising judicial, ministerial, or
municipal functions. See id. (manuscript at 25–28). But arguably none of these functions is, strictly
speaking, part of “the executive power” to execute law. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 336
(noting that coroners are not removable at the pleasure of the king and that they exercise “either
judicial or ministerial; but principally judicial” power); id. at 328 (explaining that municipal
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One implication of this argument is that even if “the executive
power” is not a reference to the bundle of royal prerogatives, the scope
of the president’s power to remove and direct administrative officials
depends on whether one adopts Professor Mortenson’s thin law-

officials relate to “mere private and strictly municipal rights, depending entirely upon the
domestic constitution of their respective franchises,” and therefore do not appear to exercise the
national executive power); see also Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 W. 3 c. 2 (granting lifetime tenure
to judges in Britain).
Finally, there are a small handful of statutes that do create “commissioners” of various
sorts, some of which contain for-cause removal provisions. See Birk, supra (manuscript at 32–34).
However, these independent commissions appear to be exercising not executive power, but rather
Parliament’s historic inquisitorial power. See, e.g., 2 COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 69 (William Cobbett ed., London, R. Bagshaw 1807) (noting that in 1626 the House of
Commons asserted that it was “the antient, constant, and undoubted right and usage of
parliaments, to question and complain of all persons, of what degree soever, found grievous to
the common-wealth, in abusing the power and trust committed to them by their sovereign”); 21
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 434–36 (William Cobbett ed., London, T.C. Hansard
1814) (explaining that in a 1780 debate the Lord Chancellor stated that the matter of members of
parliament receiving public contracts is subject to the “inquisitorial” power of Parliament). The
statutes Professor Birk cites seem to fall within this power. They were enacted “[f]or better
examining and auditing the publick accounts of this kingdom,” 25 Geo. 3 c. 52; “to examine, take,
and state the publick accounts of the kingdom; and to report what balances are in the hands of
accountants, . . . and what defects there are in the present mode of receiving, collecting, issuing,
and accounting for publick money,” 20 Geo. 3 c. 54;
to enquire into the fees, gratuities, perquisites, and emoluments, which are, or have
been lately, received in the several publick offices therein mentioned; to examine into
any abuses which may exist in the same; and to report such observations as shall occur
to them, for the better conducting and managing the business transacted in the said
offices,
5 Geo. 3 c. 19; “to enquire into the losses and services of all such persons who have suffered in
their rights, properties, and professions, during the late unhappy dissentions in America,” 26 Geo.
3 c. 68; “to enquire into the losses of all such persons who have suffered in their properties, in
consequence of the cession of the province of East Florida to the king of Spain,” 26 Geo. 3 c. 75;
and “to enquire into the state and condition of the woods, forests, and land revenues, belonging
to the crown,” 26 Geo. 3 c. 87. Indeed, it is unclear these commissions did anything but make
recommendations, although the last of these commissioners were permitted to sell public lands.
Id. And the commissioners were appointed by the legislature, not by the executive. See, e.g., id.
In another paper, Professors Jane Manners and Lev Menand argue that offices with tenures
for a term of years were historically understood not to permit removal until the term expired.
Jane Manners & Lev Menand, Presidential Removal: Defining Inefficiency, Neglect of Duty, and
Malfeasance in Office, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 27–42),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3520377 [https://perma.cc/9ARG-FMMZ]. I agree with their statutory
analysis, but it does not answer the constitutional question of whether such fixed terms without
removal would be permissible for federal executive officers. Indeed, Manners and Menand
explicitly avoid an in-depth analysis of the Executive Vesting Clause. Id. (manuscript at 18).
Moreover, their own evidence suggests that a fixed term with no removal would have been
understood to be unconstitutional: for the first one hundred years, Congress almost always added
to statutory provisions providing for fixed terms the proviso, “unless sooner removed by the
president.” See id. (manuscript at 35). The most natural implication is that Congress believed it
had to do so as a constitutional matter.
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execution reading, the cross-reference reading, or the thick reading
presented here. Under the thin account, according to which “the
executive power” is an entirely empty vessel, arguably Congress may
freely limit the president’s removal and directory power.206 Under one
version of the cross-reference theory, the Take Care Clause implies the
necessary power for overseeing faithful execution. In this view,
Congress’s power is limited somewhat, but it can at least establish forcause removal provisions. As a result, Congress can insulate
subordinate officers from presidential direction so long as those
officers are faithfully exercising any discretion within the bounds of the
law.207
In contrast, under the “thick” reading of “the executive power”
presented here, the power to remove is part and parcel of the executive
power itself. This means, first, that any discretion left within the bounds
of the law is the president’s discretion. The president may therefore
direct subordinate officers in the exercise of their discretion, even if a
contrary decision by the subordinate would otherwise have been a
faithful execution. And it means, second, that Congress cannot limit
the presidential removal power, contrary to Professor McConnell’s
view. According to McConnell, “the executive power” is entirely
defeasible to the extent Congress has an enumerated power. And as
part of the necessary and proper power to establish offices and
assistants, Congress does have an enumerated power to condition the
removal of executive officers. McConnell therefore argues instead for
an indefeasible but more limited removal power on the basis of the
Take Care Clause. He argues, along with Madison, that this clause
implies that the president must have that species of power, namely
removal, to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.208
Under the account presented here, the content of the laws that the
executive carries into execution are, of course, determined entirely by
206. Although Professor Mortenson has yet to articulate his views on the removal power,
based on his paper and my discussions with him, my characterization is consistent with his
account. See Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1269 (“[The Founding generation]
would have understood the [executive] power as an empty vessel whose authority in any particular
case depended entirely on the substantive decisions of the entity (sometimes the same one that
held the power to execute) which possessed the legislative power to direct executive action.”).
207. See, e.g., Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution
and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2112 (2019) (“Our history supports readings of Article
II . . . that limit Presidents to exercise their power in good faith . . . . So understood, Article II may
thus place some limits on the pardon and removal authority.”).
208. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 201–05) ( “[T]he residual executive powers
under the Vesting Clause are defeasible, not prerogative, powers.”).
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some preexisting authority. The president cannot execute anything
that is not already a law. But “the executive power” to carry these laws
into execution, and all that this executive power entails—
appointments, removals, and, as we shall see presently, proclamations
(executive orders)—is vested in the president. Congress cannot reduce
this power because Congress and the Senate have only such powers
over the component parts of “the executive power” as the Constitution
itself distributes to them. Thus, these institutions have part of the
appointment power but no other parts of “the executive power.”
B. Prosecution
The power to prosecute is not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution, and yet the executive has conducted prosecutions from
the beginning of the Republic. The controversy over this power today
involves whether Congress can create prosecutorial offices
independent of the president. In 1978, Congress enacted the Ethics in
Government Act, giving a special court the power to appoint, at the
recommendation of the attorney general, an “independent counsel” to
investigate high-level government misconduct.209 This independent
counsel had the “full power and independent authority to exercise all
investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the
Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or
employee of the Department of Justice.”210 In other words, the counsel
was a prosecutor, and was to be “independent” of the president—the
president could not remove the counsel, and the attorney general could
only remove her for good cause.211
In Morrison v. Olson,212 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the independent counsel in a 7–1 decision.213 Justice
Scalia penned a lone dissent, famously writing: “Article II, § 1, cl. 1, of
the Constitution provides: ‘The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States.’ . . . [T]his does not mean some of the
executive power, but all of the executive power.”214 Justice Scalia was
surely—or at least mostly—right: the clause does vest all of “the

209. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 601–602, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867–
74 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591–598 (2018)).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a).
211. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660–63 (1988).
212. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
213. Id. at 658, 696–97.
214. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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executive power” in the president, subject to the more specific
appointment power exception. The question, however, is what
constitutes this “executive power.” It may not include a residuum of
prerogative powers—in fact, there is no evidence that Justice Scalia
ever adopted such a reading of the clause215—but it might very well
include the power to oversee all federal prosecutions.
Indeed, the power over prosecution appears in Blackstone’s
discussion of “the executive power of the laws.” Under a new roman
numeral, Blackstone explained that “[a]nother capacity, in which the
king is considered in domestic affairs, is as the fountain of justice and
general conservator of the peace of the kingdom.”216 Under this
heading, Blackstone described the king’s power to erect courts to assist
in exercising “the whole executive power of the laws.”217 Blackstone
then mentions criminal prosecutions. “In criminal proceedings, or
prosecutions for offences,” it would be absurd for the king “personally”
to sit in judgment because he is also the “prosecutor.”218 Because the
public “has delegated all it’s power and rights, with regard to the
execution of the laws, to one visible magistrate, all affronts to that
power, and breaches of those rights, are immediately offences against
him,” and the king “is therefore the proper person to prosecute for all
public offences and breaches of the peace, being the person injured in
the eye of the law.”219 This discussion suggests an explanation for why
the executive has historically conducted prosecutions. It is not because
prosecution is an unenumerated “executive” or “prerogative” power
vested by virtue of a residual grant of power. It is because prosecution
is part of “the executive power” to execute law.
Thus, under the law-execution conception of “the executive
power,” Congress may still be unable to divest the president of the
215. Justice Thomas adopted the residual vesting thesis in the Zivotofsky II passport case
(more on that case in Part IV.B.6), but Justice Scalia did not. In responding to Justice Thomas’s
argument, Justice Scalia wrote:
The combination of (a) the concurrence’s assertion of broad, unenumerated “residual
powers” in the President; (b) its parsimonious interpretation of Congress’s enumerated
powers; and (c) its even more parsimonious interpretation of Congress’s authority to
enact laws “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the President’s
executive powers; produces (d) a presidency more reminiscent of George III than
George Washington.
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1, 84 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
216. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 257.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 258 (emphasis omitted).
219. Id. at 258–59 (emphasis added).
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prosecutorial power. Some scholars have claimed that “prosecution”
was never an executive function, at least not one that had to be done
by the president, and so Congress can limit the president’s control over
prosecution. But these arguments are unpersuasive.
In a prominent article, Professors Lawrence Lessig and Cass
Sunstein argue that prosecution was considered “administrative,” as
opposed to “executive,” and that the Framers therefore did not intend
a unitary executive with control over prosecution.220 Lessig and
Sunstein’s arguments, however, miss critical historical evidence. They
first argue that federal district attorneys (now U.S. attorneys) did not
report to any central authority.221 Yet even they recognize that
presidents directed or countermanded these officers at least some of
the time.222 But more importantly, the district attorneys did report to a
central authority. Professors Lessig and Sunstein claim they did not
because there was nothing like the Department of Justice in the early
years of the Republic. “Until 1861,” they write, “these district attorneys
did not report to the Attorney General, and were not in any clear way
answerable to him,” and until 1820 the district attorneys reported to
“no one.”223
It turns out this assertion is likely incorrect. There was no
Department of Justice, but the district attorneys did report directly to
the secretary of state. The evidence for this is that when the chief clerk
of the Department of State resigned in 1792, he left an account of the
Department’s filing system, noting that “[t]he Consular returns are at
the bottom of said desk right hand side; and so are the Letters from the
Attornies of districts, which are tied together.”224 Thus, as historian

220. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 6 & n.14, 14–22.
221. Id. at 16–17, 76.
222. For example, they concede that “Jefferson at least exercised the directory power when
he ordered district attorneys to cease prosecution under the Alien and Sedition Acts.” Id. at 18
n.75. And, as Professors Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash have pointed out, George
Washington “‘instructed’ the attorney for the Pennsylvania district to nol-pros an indictment
against the two individuals who had been accused of rioting,” and further directed the district
attorneys to collect information regarding all infractions of the Neutrality Proclamation that came
within their purview. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 659 (1994) (quoting 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799, at 455 n.35 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)).
223. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 16.
224. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 503
(1948).
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Leonard White concluded, “The federal marshals and attorneys
received their instructions from the Department of State.”225
It may seem odd for the State Department to be involved in such
matters, but it makes sense in light of the First Congress’s decision not
to create a “home department.” Instead of the additional expense, the
representatives thought it would be easy enough to assign the duties of
a would-be home department to the already-existing executive
departments. The home department would have had a principal officer,
one of whose duties would have been “to see to the execution of the
laws of the Union.”226 The officer would “do and attend to all such
matters and things as he may be directed to do by the President.”227
The motion to create such a department was defeated when several
members objected that the secretary of foreign affairs—later the
secretary of state—could attend to most of the duties proposed for the
home secretary.228
This is consistent with other historical evidence. White has
observed that cases involving ships, such as prizes, privateers, and
foreign vessels, were of “considerable importance” and “often came to
the attention of the Secretary of State.”229 Cases involving the embargo
of 1794 and the Nonintercourse Act of 1798 also “were such as to
require direction from the State Department.”230 Secretary of State
Timothy Pickering actively instructed the district attorneys to
prosecute cases under the Sedition Act of 1798.231 In another example,
Pickering had to order the attorney in New York to release a British
captain that had been arrested.232

225. Id. at 133. Of course, the presence of the correspondence alone does not establish the
extent of the supervision; some interactions between the secretary of state and the federal
attorneys appear to have been in the nature of requests. See id. at 408. Nevertheless, there was
centralized supervision; and, as explained presently, on many occasions the president and
secretary of state did in fact instruct the attorneys specifically.
226. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 666 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 667–68 (statements of Reps. Huntington and Sedgwick); id. at 669 (stating that the
motion to establish “an Executive Department” was lost by “a considerable majority”).
Interestingly, a few members argued that the duty of law execution was the judiciary’s. Id. at 667
(statements of Reps. Benson and White). This seems clearly contrary to the Constitution’s
injunction that the president shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
229. WHITE, supra note 224, at 407.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 407–08.
232. Id. at 485.
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To be sure, White wrote, “[a]part from cases of exceptional
importance and difficulty,” these attorneys “operated largely on their
own responsibility.”233 That is, no doubt, because channels of
communication were much slower in the 1790s, requiring this degree
of independence. Yet when necessary the attorneys were centrally
controlled by the executive branch. Although there is no clear evidence
of any district attorney being removed, there is no indication that they
could not be removed at will.
Lessig and Sunstein next argue that the comptroller of the treasury
was responsible for prosecuting revenue suits, and the comptroller’s
decisions to prosecute were “relatively independent” and “outside the
direct control of the President.”234 One of the two sources on which
they rely, however, states only that the comptroller’s “decisions against
claimants would be ‘final and conclusive.’”235 The question of
conclusiveness had to do with whether the decisions of the comptroller
would be subject to judicial review, and not whether the comptroller
would be subject to the president’s directory and removal authority.236
The other source indicates only that the Comptroller would make
reports to Congress.237 Moreover, nothing in the statute withheld from
the president the power to direct, control, or remove the comptroller.238
Finally, Lessig and Sunstein argue that “federal officers were not
the only ones who conducted federal prosecutions.”239 State officials,
they write, “also conducted federal prosecutions, and these officers
were clearly not subject to control by the President.”240 The only

233. Id. at 408.
234. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 17–18 (quoting DARRELL HEVENOR SMITH, THE
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES, AND ORGANIZATION 22 (1927)).
235. Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of
Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 74 (1983) (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1795, ch. 48, § 4, 1 Stat.
441, 442).
236. Whether an executive branch agency or official could act conclusively—or whether her
acts would be judicially reviewable—had to do with the rights–privileges distinction in the
nineteenth century. As Professor Caleb Nelson has written, “the public/private distinction had
considerable resolving power; it formed the basis for a framework that was used throughout the
nineteenth century to separate matters that required ‘judicial’ involvement from matters that the
political branches could conclusively adjudicate on their own.” Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the
Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 564 (2007). Courts routinely determined whether
agency determinations were “conclusive” as opposed to being subject to judicial review. Id. at
577–82 (citing numerous cases).
237. SMITH, supra note 234, at 22.
238. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 222, at 653.
239. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 18.
240. Id. at 18–19.
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statutory example cited by the authors for this proposition, however, is
a single section of a single act respecting enemy aliens.241 This section
merely granted jurisdiction to state courts to hear federal claims
against such aliens by authorizing the “several courts of the United
States, and of each state, having criminal jurisdiction,” as well as “the
several judges and justices of the courts of the United States,” “upon
complaint” against any such enemy alien, “to cause such alien or aliens
to be duly apprehended and convened before such court, judge or
justice.”242 The act went on to authorize the courts “after a full
examination and hearing on such complaint, and sufficient cause
therefor appearing,” to order the removal of the enemy alien from the
United States.243
There does not appear to be anything in this statute authorizing
state officials to prosecute such federal actions in the state courts,
although of course that does not disprove that they did so. Still, this
particular statute does not establish a lack of presidential control,
either. It merely authorized state courts to hear such actions, which is
consistent with the Constitutional Convention’s famous “Madisonian
Compromise,” by which Congress would have the choice not to create
inferior federal courts and instead to rely on state courts to hear federal
cases.244 Although this provision of the statute was not written with the
utmost clarity, the margin description supports this interpretation: “All
courts of criminal jurisdiction—and also the judges of the courts of the
U. States may receive and hear complaints against alien enemies, and
make an order thereon.”245

241. Id. at 19 n.76 (citing Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § 2, 1 Stat. 577, 577).
242. § 2, 1 Stat. at 577.
243. § 2, 1 Stat. at 577–78.
244. This compromise, described in Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional
Power To Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New
Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 52–56 (1975), is enshrined in the text of Article III, which
provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
245. § 2, 1 Stat. at 577. The secondary sources on which Lessig and Sunstein rely also point to
this kind of evidence. Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 303 (1989) (“Congress vested jurisdiction in state
courts over actions seeking penalties and forfeitures, granted concurrent jurisdiction to state
courts over some criminal actions, and assigned state officials auxiliary law enforcement tasks.”);
THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 269–70 (Phila., Abraham Small 1822) (noting
instances of concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction). That, again, is perfectly consistent
with the Madisonian Compromise and does not bear on the question of the president’s Article II
powers. As for the auxiliary tasks—including arresting fugitive slaves and deserting seamen—
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In a recent article arguing that prosecution was not necessarily
“executive,” Professor Peter Shane suggests that prosecution was
likely considered to be neither executive nor administrative but rather
a “judicial” function.246 Yet Shane’s evidence is also subject to contrary
interpretations. Shane states that the ratifiers in 1789 “would not have
experienced . . . a widespread commitment to concentrated executive
power.”247 Yet as Professor Mortenson demonstrates, the central thrust
of the complaints against the Articles of Confederation was precisely
that there was a complete lack of centralized execution—the
confederation government had to rely upon the unreliable states for
the execution of federal law.248 Shane also relies on state legislative
appointments of states’ attorneys or attorneys general, or the vesting
of the power to so appoint in courts;249 indeed, to this day Congress has
vested in courts the power to appoint U.S. attorneys under certain
conditions.250 But of course, as Mortenson himself recognizes and as
explained above, “the executive power” was understood to be the
power to carry the law into execution and to appoint assistants to do so
where their appointments had not already been provided for by law.251
these “cannot be characterized as prosecution,” although “they were certainly related to criminal
law enforcement.” Krent, supra, at 305. To be sure, there is some evidence that the Founders
expected Congress to have the power to commandeer state executive officers to enforce federal
law. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104,
1111 (2013) (“[F]ederal power to commandeer state officers was generally accepted at the
Founding . . . .”); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957,
1960, 1990–2007 (1993) (“Though the Founding Generation did not wish to permit coercion of
states in their sovereign, legislative capacities, many individuals envisioned federal
commandeering of state executive officers.”). But even had they done so, it hardly follows that
federal officials enforcing federal laws would not be removable by the president, in the same sense
that state courts exercising general jurisdiction to hear federal cases need not have judges with
the same salary and tenure protection as federal judges.
246. Peter M. Shane, Prosecutors at the Periphery, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 241, 251–62 (2019).
247. Id. at 252.
248. Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 14–27).
249. Shane, supra note 246, at 253, 256.
250. 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) (2018) (permitting a district court to appoint a U.S. attorney for its
district upon expiry of a prior appointment by the attorney general).
251. Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 52, 58–62); see supra
notes 163–65, 193 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting that relying on the fact of judicial
appointments of attorneys general is anachronistic. The federal attorney general, for example, did
not have control over prosecution until the late nineteenth century because the attorney general
was simply the government’s lawyer, who represented the government in court. But the State
Department did supervise prosecution. See supra notes 224–33 and accompanying text. The
attorney general in the eighteenth century was a different kind of officer than in nineteenth
century. This also explains why Professor Shane’s reliance on the lack of centralized law
enforcement control may be misplaced. See Shane, supra note 246, at 255–57. Again, there was
centralized control—just in the State Department.
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And the Constitution explicitly contemplates “Courts of Law”
appointing inferior officers at Congress’s discretion.252
Perhaps more to the point, the Framers’ key source on executive
power—Blackstone253—expressly disagrees with Shane’s proposition
that prosecution was a judicial power. As noted above, Blackstone
argued that the king could not “personally [sit] in judgment” precisely
because he was the “prosecutor,” and he was prosecutor because the
public “has delegated all it’s power and rights, with regard to the
execution of the laws, to one visible magistrate.”254 One reason the king
did not personally exercise the judicial power was because he exercised
“the executive power” as the prosecutor in chief.
In conclusion,255 Blackstone and Founding-era sources suggest
that the power to prosecute offenses—and to appoint, instruct, and
252. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
253. See supra note 37 and Part II.A.
254. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 258–59 (emphasis omitted).
255. In addition to state officers purportedly exercising federal executive power, Lessig and
Sunstein also pointed to qui tam actions by which a private individual could bring an action to
enforce federal law. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 20. Calabresi and Prakash observe,
however, that the British king historically had the power to pardon defendants in qui tam actions
preemptively and thus that the executive still retained ultimate authority when private parties
prosecuted the law. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 222, at 660–61. Shane also notes that
prosecution was largely private. Shane, supra note 246, at 256–57. Regardless, qui tam actions are
at most a vestigial component of the common law (and even of Roman criminal law) dating from
a time long before kings exercised centralized authority and even longer before the development
of separation of powers doctrine. Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001
WIS. L. REV. 381, 385–86. As for private criminal prosecutions, a practice which existed in some
American states in the nineteenth century, it appears that these were conducted in coordination
with public prosecutorial officials. Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in
the Nineteenth-Century United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43, 45–49 (1995).
Other attempts to prove that prosecution was not executive similarly fall short. As I have
written before, see Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359, 408 n.217
(2017), Harold Krent has written an entire article critiquing the idea that criminal law
enforcement is a core executive power, see Krent, supra note 245 passim. His critique, however,
is unsatisfactory. To give only a few examples, Krent first argues that Congress has wide power
to structure executive enforcement of the law. But his evidence is quite odd. He notes that “the
Constitution assigns Congress the fundamental task of defining the content of criminal laws.” Id.
at 282. But that is the legislative power and thus beside the point. He next suggests Congress has
“authority to decide how the criminal laws are to be enforced” because it “may specify what
penalties are to be assessed for various criminal violations, what law enforcement agencies have
jurisdiction over particular criminal investigations, and what procedures the executive branch
must follow in investigating crimes.” Id. at 283 (footnotes omitted). But deciding what the
penalties for crimes shall be is also legislative. And it is well accepted that Congress may create
inferior offices and departments to aid the president in execution of the laws—that says nothing
of the president’s directive control over such inferior officers. He thirdly points to Congress’s
power of appropriation as “a potent weapon with which to influence the Executive’s criminal law
enforcement authority.” Id. at 284. Yet again that seems irrelevant. That Congress has the power
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remove subordinate officers engaged in such prosecutions—is likely
part of “the executive power” of the laws, even under the narrower
understanding of the term.
C. Proclamation Power
The power to issue “proclamations” is another prerogative listed
in Blackstone that has sometimes been described as “missing” from the
Constitution.256 Yet this prerogative was also likely understood to be
part of “the executive power” to carry law into execution.
Understanding “the executive power” to include this proclamation
power has significant implications both for modern administrative
regulations and also for what is perhaps the most famous separation of
powers dispute of all time—President Truman’s seizure of the steel
mills.
1. Blackstone. Under the same roman numeral heading under
which Blackstone described the king’s power to erect courts and
prosecute crimes, Blackstone also described the power to issue
proclamations. “From the same original, of the king’s being the
fountain of justice, we may also deduce the prerogative of issuing
proclamations . . . . These proclamations have then a binding force,
when . . . they are grounded upon and enforce the laws of the realm.”257
Lawmaking is the work of the legislative branch, “yet the manner, time,
and circumstances of putting those laws in execution must frequently be
left to the discretion of the executive magistrate.”258 Therefore, the
king’s “proclamations, are binding upon the subject, where they do not
either contradict the old laws, or tend to establish new ones; but only
enforce the execution of such laws as are already in being, in such
manner as the king shall judge necessary.”259 Blackstone then added
that the infamous Statute of Proclamations, by which it was enacted
“that the king’s proclamations should have the force of acts of
parliament[,] . . . was calculated to introduce the most despotic
tyranny.”260
of the purse and can influence the executive through use of that power says nothing at all about
what is or is not executive power.
256. Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 276–77
(2009).
257. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 260–61.
258. Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
259. Id. (emphasis added).
260. Id.
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Once again, then, Blackstone’s Commentaries reflect a thick
version of “the executive power” whereby the president has the power
to issue regulations and proclamations to help carry into execution the
national laws. The proclamation prerogative is deduced from, and
therefore included within, the greater prerogative to execute law. This
has implications for administrative regulations and for the Steel Seizure
Case, addressed below. It also suggests a previously unexplored
argument in favor of the power to direct subordinate executive officers.
James Madison and Fisher Ames assumed the directory power was
part of “the executive power”; but Blackstone implied such a power
too. For if the king’s proclamations were binding on the subjects, then
surely they were also binding on a subset of those subjects, namely
subordinate executive officers. If anyone had to abide by the king’s
proclamations—“executive orders,” as they would be known today—it
was those subjects serving as officers in his government.261
2. Administrative Regulations. Blackstone’s proclamation power
may help clarify the role of modern administrative regulations under
the Constitution. I have argued elsewhere that the president has a
“specification power,” akin to Blackstone’s proclamation power, to
make regulations to help fill gaps in statutes.262 This power is justified

261. Professor Peter Strauss argues that historically “the President could assure the faithful
execution of the laws only through removal of one who failed to follow his directions, rather than
substitution of his own decision.” See Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or “The Decider”?
The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 705–06 (2007). Thus the
president is an “overseer” and not a “decider.” Whatever the merits of that argument, the present
argument, which does not depend on the president’s ability to execute the law personally, is not
to the contrary. But see Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 701, 716–17 (arguing that the president must be able to execute the law personally).
At a minimum, the president can instruct and direct officers and, if they disobey, remove them.
What of the Opinions in Writing Clause? To be sure, that clause, purporting to authorize
the president to seek the opinions in writing of the principal officers of the “executive”
departments, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, may be superfluous under my reading of “the executive
power,” see, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 32–38 (“No doubt, standing alone in the
face of clear evidence that the framers were adopting the strong unitary conception, this clause
would be a slender reed, and a redundancy.”). But there is at least an explanation for why the
clause was included in the Constitution: it was a rejection of last-minute proposals to reintroduce
a council of state and to allow the president to seek the opinions of the Chief Justice and the
officers of Congress. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 335, 342–44, 367. With such a simple
explanation at hand, the redundancy of the clause is far too thin a reed on which to rely to refute
all the other evidence of the meaning of “the executive power.”
262. Ilan Wurman, The Specification Power, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 689, 695 (2020) [hereinafter
Wurman, The Specification Power] (“This is the power to fill in the details where the statute is
clear but does not specify the course of action.”). Because that piece details the specification
power more fully, this Article does not discuss it in depth.
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not only under a residual reading of the Executive Vesting Clause but
also under the thick law-execution reading proposed here. Even if “the
executive power” refers only to the power to carry law into execution,
that power nevertheless includes as a necessary incident the derivative
power to make regulations and proclamations—at least to the extent
that such regulations do not “contradict the old laws, or tend to
establish new ones.” Such a power, Blackstone wrote, can be
“deduced” from the king’s executive power of the laws.263
The question of defeasibility arises here, too. Just as with the
power to carry laws into execution generally, the proclamation power
is strictly subject to Congress’s laws; it can only be exercised in
furtherance of those laws. And Congress can always obviate the need
for a particular proclamation or regulation by legislating with more
specificity. And perhaps Congress can empower subordinate executive
officers only to execute the law in a certain way—for example, by
engaging in adjudications and not rulemakings.264 But what Congress
cannot do is prohibit the president of the United States from issuing
proclamations—namely, executive orders—as part of the president’s
efforts to carry Congress’s law into execution. That power is part of
“the executive power,” not defeasible by statute.
3. Youngstown. The proclamation power casts the Steel Seizure
Case in a new light. The debate was not over whether the president had
“emergency” or “inherent” executive power to seize steel mills. The
question was instead whether the president properly exercised the
proclamation power to help carry existing national laws into execution
or whether he slipped into new lawmaking. The debate, to take the
words of Blackstone, was over whether President Truman’s executive
order “enforce[d] the execution of such laws as are already in being,”
or instead “contradict[ed] the old laws, or tend[ed] to establish new
ones.”265 Properly understood, that is the exact debate that went on
between the majority and dissent.

263. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
264. This is standard administrative law doctrine: agencies have only those powers delegated
by Congress, and they cannot issue rulemakings without authorization. See, e.g., Nat’l Petroleum
Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“The extent of [an agency’s] powers
can be decided only by considering the powers Congress specifically granted it . . . .”).
265. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 261.
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The facts are familiar. The nation’s steelworkers were about to go
on strike, but President Truman was prosecuting the Korean War.266
For that, he needed steel.267 Truman therefore ordered his commerce
secretary to seize and operate the steel mills.268 There was no statute
prohibiting the president’s actions; however, Congress had explicitly
provided for seizures in different circumstances, and had even
considered and rejected providing such a power in the kind of
circumstances at hand.269 The opinion is celebrated for Justice
Jackson’s concurrence, in which he elaborated a tripartite framework
for thinking about separation of powers concerns. In the first category,
the president is merely executing Congress’s laws, and so presidential
power is at its zenith.270 In the second category, Congress has been
silent on the matter; here “there is a zone of twilight in which [the
president] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain,” and “any actual test of power is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than on abstract theories of law.”271 In the third category,
Congress has expressly forbidden an action, and the president’s power
depends on the president’s “constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”272 Jackson
concluded that the Truman administration was effectively operating in
the third category.273
The best analysis, however, comes from the exchange between the
majority and the dissent. Justice Black’s majority opinion argued that
there are only two sources of presidential power: either a congressional
266. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 668, 672
(1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
267. See, e.g., id. at 670.
268. Id. at 582–84 (majority opinion).
269. As the Youngstown majority explained,
There are two statutes which do authorize the President to take both personal and real
property under certain conditions. However, the Government admits that these
conditions were not met and that the President’s order was not rooted in either of the
statutes. The Government refers to the seizure provisions of one of these statutes
(§ 201(b) of the Defense Production Act) as “much too cumbersome, involved, and
time-consuming for the crisis which was at hand.”
Id. at 585–86 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the use of the seizure technique to solve labor
disputes in order to prevent work stoppages was not only unauthorized by any congressional
enactment; prior to this controversy, Congress had refused to adopt that method of settling labor
disputes.
270. Id. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
271. Id. at 637.
272. Id. at 637–38.
273. Id. at 640.
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statute—such that the president is merely executing the law—or an
independent constitutional provision.274 Justice Black agreed with
Justice Jackson that there was no statute authorizing the president’s
actions.275 The majority then discounted the commander-in-chief
power because the United States itself was not a “theater of war.”276
All that was left was “the executive power.” Justice Black explained,
“Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several
constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President.
In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker.”277 By seizing the steel mills, the president was not
purporting to execute the laws, but rather to make a new law.278
The dissenters, led by Chief Justice Vinson, did not argue that the
president had “emergency power,” or some residual “executive”
power of which seizing the steel mills was a part. Rather, they argued
that to carry all of Congress’s laws into execution required seizing the
steel mills until Congress could act. They observed that the Senate had
ratified various defense treaties (including the U.N. Charter and
NATO), and Congress had enacted defense and anti-inflationary
legislation, including legislation granting the president power “to
stabilize prices and wages and to provide for settlement of labor
disputes arising in the defense program.”279 “The President has the duty
to execute the foregoing legislative programs,” the dissenters
concluded, and “[t]heir successful execution depends upon continued
production of steel and stabilized prices for steel.”280 Vinson then
surveyed dozens of examples through U.S. history of presidents
exercising a kind of proclamation power to help carry law into
execution in the absence of more specific directions from Congress.281

274. See id. at 585 (majority opinion).
275. Id. at 585–86.
276. Id. at 587.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 588 (“The President’s order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed
in a manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner
prescribed by the President.”).
279. Id. at 667–69, 671–72 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 672.
281. Id. at 683–700. For example, President John Adams had issued an arrest warrant
pursuant to an extradition treaty, although Congress had not enacted legislation enforcing that
treaty. Id. at 684. John Marshall, then a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, argued
that “[t]he treaty, which is a law, enjoins the performance of a particular object” and that the
president may “perform the object, although the particular mode of using the means has not been
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Put another way, Congress sometimes leaves out details necessary
for implementing a law. Indeed, that is why the president must have a
power to “specify” administratively certain details of implementation,
so that the statute as a whole can be executed.282 This power that the
executive had frequently exercised, in other words, was nothing other
than the proclamation power described by Blackstone as the power
over “the manner, time, and circumstances of putting . . . laws in
execution.”283
The question boiled down to a lower-order dispute: whether
President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills was merely a “detail” of
implementation specifying the “manner, time, and circumstances of
putting” Congress’s legislative programs “in execution” in the absence
of more specific direction from Congress. Chief Justice Vinson said yes;
Justice Black said Truman was engaged in new lawmaking. Formulated
thus, Youngstown is probably a harder case than is typically believed.
Surely there was something to the dissent’s point that if steel
production stopped, a whole set of congressional objectives would be
compromised. On the other hand, the president can only execute the
laws—and prosecute wars—with the tools, officers, and armies that
Congress provides. Congress, after all, is given the power to raise fleets
and armies, and to appropriate and provide for them.284 Seizing the
steel mills seems like precisely an attempt to raise and provide for the
army and navy, as Truman’s own executive order suggested.285 That
seems like new lawmaking.
Whatever the lower-order result, the debate in Youngstown
between the majority and the dissent is consistent with a thick
understanding of “the executive power” and does not require adopting
a residual account of the Executive Vesting Clause. Moreover, it
reveals that Justice Jackson’s concurrence was largely a distraction
from the case’s true controversy.
The above analyses suggest that many domestic separation of
powers practices and disputes—appointments, removals, presidential
direction, and Youngstown—can be better understood on a thick
prescribed”; Congress could of course prescribe the mode of execution, but until it did so, “it
seems the duty of the Executive department to execute the contract by any means it possesses.”
Id. (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613–14 (1800)).
282. See Wurman, The Specification Power, supra note 262, at 712–13; supra Part III.C.2.
283. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 261.
284. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–13.
285. Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 673–75 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Exec. Order
10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952)).
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conception of “the executive power” to carry law into execution. The
upshot is that, at least in the domestic sphere, the president probably
has more power than under a thin law-execution reading of Article II’s
Vesting Clause. Although here, too, the president may sometimes have
less power than the residual theorists claim.286
IV. THE EXECUTIVE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The account of “the executive power” proposed here is also
consistent with a wide variety of presidential foreign affairs powers and
activities, although it cannot justify everything presidents have done in
this field. Still, a thick law-execution reading of “the executive power”
explains better than any other available theory the validity of the
Neutrality Proclamation, on what conditions the president may
terminate treaties, the ability to instruct and recall ambassadors, and
what presidential power there might be to recognize foreign
governments. Although Professor Mortenson claims that the ability to
torture terrorists marks a key difference between a law-execution and
a residual vesting thesis of the Executive Vesting Clause,287 an
indefeasible executive prerogative to torture terrorists is
unsupportable on any account of the clause—whether it is the thin lawexecution version, the thick law-execution version, or the residual
version. Under any of these readings, the executive might be able to
torture terrorists as part of the commander-in-chief power if Congress
has not legislated on the matter. Even that is questionable. Certainly
there is no power under any of the accounts to torture in spite of what
Congress has legislated.288
Part IV.A briefly describes the five other available theories of
presidential foreign affairs powers, including the residual vesting thesis
and Mortenson’s thin law-execution theory. Part IV.B then analyzes
the presidential powers and precedents described above to show how
a thick understanding of “the executive power” to execute the law
better explains most of these powers and precedents, although it
286. For example, this Article casts some doubt on In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), in which
the Supreme Court held that the president had inherent power to assign a federal marshal to
protect the life of Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field. Id. at 67. Perhaps a narrow “protective”
power can be justified on the thick reading of the executive power proposed here, though I am
somewhat skeptical. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (arguing for a narrow but inherent power of the president “to protect and
defend the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the United States from harm”).
287. Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 3–4).
288. See infra Part IV.B.5.
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cannot explain all assertions of presidential power (nor should it have
to). Ultimately, the thick law-execution reading is the theory of best fit
across the Constitution’s text, structure, intent, and historical practice.
Further, some modern presidential practices and Supreme Court
opinions in this area are probably unconstitutional or mistaken.
A. The Standard Picture
Professors Prakash and Ramsey, writing in 2001, describe three
schools in the foreign affairs scholarship that can be labeled as
“atextual.”289 These three schools respectively maintain that the
president has primacy in foreign affairs, that Congress has primacy in
foreign affairs, or that there is an indeterminate allocation of foreign
affairs power in the Constitution.290 What these schools have in
common, Prakash and Ramsey write, are that they have all “given up
on the Constitution.”291
The Supreme Court gave voice to the presidential primacy school
in the famous Curtiss-Wright292 case, where the Court upheld a
congressional delegation of power to the president to determine
whether certain international arms sales should be prohibited.293 The
Court noted “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for
its exercise an act of Congress.”294 More recently, the modern Supreme
Court gave voice to presidential primacy when it concluded that
Congress, which otherwise legislates over passports, could not require
that the country “Israel” be listed as the nation of birth at the request
of someone born in Jerusalem.295 On the topic of which foreign nations
to recognize, the Court held, “the Nation must ‘speak . . . with one
voice’”—the President’s.296 The Court’s pronouncement in this case
suggests that functional concerns—the nation must speak with one
voice—take precedence over the constitutional text.
289. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 238 (“[T]hese camps have not articulated a
complete or convincing theory, nor one soundly based on the Constitution’s text.”).
290. Id. at 238–43.
291. Id. at 233.
292. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
293. Id. at 331–33.
294. Id. at 320.
295. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1, 8–9, 31–32 (2015).
296. Id. at 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424
(2003)).
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The congressional primacy school correctly recognizes that
Congress gets many foreign affairs powers. “[V]irtually every
substantive constitutional power touching on foreign affairs is vested
in Congress,” Professor John Hart Ely wrote, and therefore “[t]he
Constitution gives the president no general right to make foreign
policy.”297 Yet the Constitution gives some foreign affairs power to
Congress and some to the president; the Constitution does not vest a
“general” foreign affairs power in explicit terms in either branch.298
Thus, Professor Edward Corwin argued that the federal
government is vested with “unallocated” foreign affairs powers,
leaving it up to Congress and the president “to struggle for the privilege
of directing American foreign policy.”299 And Professor Louis Henkin
described the Constitution as a “laconic document” on foreign affairs,
arguing that “[a]ttempts to build all the foreign affairs powers of the
federal government with the few bricks provided by the Constitution
have not been widely accepted.”300
Prakash and Ramsey reject these three atextual views and root
most presidential powers in a residual grant of executive and
prerogative powers in the Executive Vesting Clause. “By the first
sentence of Article II, ‘the executive Power shall be vested’ in the
President. Executive power, as commonly understood in the
eighteenth century, included foreign affairs powers.”301 This foreign
affairs power “is residual, encompassing only those executive foreign
affairs powers not allocated elsewhere by the Constitution’s text.”302 As
Parts I and II argued, however, a residual vesting clause is implausible
in light of the textual evidence, the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention, and the silence of the ratification debates.
Mortenson’s recent account is also textual: “the executive power”
is the power to carry laws into execution. Mortenson’s account,
however, might not be able to account for a variety of presidential
297. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 240 (alterations in original) (quoting JOHN HART
ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 149 (1996)).
298. Id. at 245.
299. CORWIN, supra note 10, at 171–72 (arguing that foreign affairs powers are inherent in
sovereignty, and that the president, Senate, and Congress vie for “the decisive and final voice in
determining the course of the American nation”); see also Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at
242.
300. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 13–15 (2d ed. 1996);
see also Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 242.
301. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 252–53 (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 1).
302. Id. at 253 (emphasis omitted).
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foreign affairs powers. “There is no question,” he writes, “that the
Constitution’s terms are abstract and incomplete in most respects, and
nowhere more so than the allocation of foreign affairs powers.”303
Although he has yet to flesh out these arguments, he currently believes
that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power to fill
in any foreign affairs gaps.304 Yet the Necessary and Proper Clause
might not serve particularly well as a residual grant of foreign affairs
powers because Congress can only carry into execution its own powers
or those of the president, which leads us back to identifying which of
the two departments has the relevant powers.
Nonetheless, there is a plausible argument that the Necessary and
Proper Clause could do the required work. Authorizing the president
to enter into executive agreements or to terminate treaties, for
example, could be convenient and useful to any number of
congressional and presidential powers. But even so, the clause was
historically understood only as a grant of implied powers and did not
include “great substantive and independent power[s].”305 And the
missing foreign affairs powers, like terminating treaties and entering
into executive agreements, are arguably great, substantive, and
independent powers. Additionally, even if the clause could do the
required work, the historical record is potentially inconsistent: the
congressional authorizations that would be required under the
Necessary and Proper Clause for the exercise of certain presidential
foreign affairs powers might be lacking.306

303. Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1190.
304. Id. at 1270 n.440.
305. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819) (stating that the
incorporation of a bank “is not, like the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating
commerce, a great substantive and independent power, which cannot be implied as incidental to
other powers, or used as a means of executing them” (emphasis added)); The Bank Bill, GAZETTE
U.S. (Phila.), Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 372, 378–79 (Charles
F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981) (reporting Madison’s speech to Congress, in which
he opposed the incorporation of a national bank under the Necessary and Proper Clause as an
exercise of a “particularly . . . great and important power,” and noted that incorporating a bank
“was in its nature a distinct, an independent and substantive prerogative”); cf. GARY LAWSON,
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 60–62, 83, 117–19 (2010) (arguing that similar antecedent
clauses had been grants of implied and incidental, and not great and important, powers).
306. Congress does typically grant authority to the president to create executive agreements,
see Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119
YALE L.J. 140, 144–45 (2009), but as far as I am aware it has not authorized unilateral treaty
terminations.
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None of the accounts, in other words, fits all the data. The three
atextual views largely ignore the constitutional text altogether. The
residual vesting thesis is not plausible in light of the text and structure,
the proceedings at the Constitutional Convention, and Ratification.
Mortenson’s thin law-execution reading relies heavily on the Necessary
and Proper Clause, which may be unable to do all of the required work.
The thick law-execution account of “the executive power” has the
most explanatory power. Without relying on a residual grant of power
or the Necessary and Proper Clause, it can explain important
presidential powers and episodes, including the Neutrality
Proclamation, terminating certain treaties, and instructing and
recalling ambassadors. But it also suggests that certain recently claimed
presidential powers—the powers to set foreign policy, exclusively to
recognize foreign governments, to torture terrorists, to enter into
executive agreements, and to terminate any treaty unilaterally—are
likely unsupportable. Under the thick law-execution account, the
president probably has fewer foreign affairs powers than some
proponents of the residual vesting thesis suggest. As compared to the
thin law-execution account, the president’s foreign affairs powers are
similar, although the power to instruct and recall ambassadors, which
depends on the president’s appointment and removal authority, are
more robust under the thick than the thin account.
B. Revisiting Presidential Powers
1. Neutrality and “Setting” Foreign Policy. The Neutrality
Proclamation is the most important of the early foreign policy
precedents. Britain and France were at war, and the question was
whether the United States was obligated to enter the war on the side
of France, with whom the United States had been allied since the
Revolutionary War.307 The only problem was that the monarch with
whom the relevant treaty was signed had just been executed during the
French Revolution, and so there had been a radical change in
government.308 And the alliance was a defensive one only, and arguably
France had begun the conflict with Britain.309 Under the circumstances,
what were the United States’ obligations?
307. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 332.
308. R.J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 105 n.185 (1974)
(“Hamilton argued that the treaty was void because of the radical change in the government of
France since its ratification . . . .”).
309. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 442 (2004).
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President Washington issued a proclamation of neutrality.310
Prakash and Ramsey argue that in so doing, “Washington confirmed
that as part of the executive power over foreign affairs, the President
unilaterally could announce the foreign policy of the United States.”311
This power to “set foreign policy,” they claim, is a “key foreign affairs
power[] that . . . cannot be encompassed by an ordinary reading of the
specific provisions of the Constitution.”312
Yet Washington’s action is explicable under the thick
understanding of “the executive power” to carry into execution the
national laws, which include treaties.313 As part of this executive power
to execute treaties, Washington could exercise the very proclamation
power described by Blackstone: he could establish “the manner, time,
and circumstances of putting those laws in execution” by
“proclamations” that “only enforce[d] the execution of such laws as are
already in being.”314
That is exactly how Hamilton initially defended the proclamation
in his debate with Madison. Writing as Pacificus, Hamilton wrote that
the legislative department “is charged neither with making nor
interpreting Treaties” nor “with enforcing the execution and
observance of these obligations and those duties” involving treaties
and foreign powers.315 Although the judiciary “is indeed charged with
the interpretation of treaties[,] . . . it exercises this function only in the
litigated cases; that is where contending parties bring before it a
specific controversy.”316 Turning to the executive, he continued, “It
must then of necessity belong to the Executive Department to exercise
the function in Question,” as
[i]t appears to be connected with that department in various
capacities, as the organ of intercourse between the Nation and
foreign Nations—as the interpreter of the National Treaties in those
cases in which the Judiciary is not competent, that is in the cases

310. George Washington, Neutrality Proclamation (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 12 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 472, 472–73 (Philander D. Chase ed.,
2005).
311. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 297.
312. Id. at 258.
313. The “supreme Law of the Land” includes the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
314. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 261.
315. PACIFICUS, supra note 68, at 11.
316. Id.
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between Government and Government—as that Power, which is
charged with the Execution of the Laws, of which Treaties form a
part—as that Power which is charged with the command and
application of the Public Force.317

Or, as he wrote toward the end of the essay, “The President is the
constitutional EXECUTOR of the laws. Our Treaties and the laws of
Nations form a part of the law of the land. He who is to execute the
laws must first judge for himself of their meaning.”318
Hamilton thus argued that the chief executive is the “interpreter
of the National Treaties” in cases not judicial in nature, and “is charged
with the Execution of the Laws, of which Treaties form a part.”319
Washington, in other words, was merely exercising “the executive
power” of the laws, which includes a proclamation power, as applied to
treaties. It is true that Hamilton went on to make the case for a kind of
residual grant of executive powers, and assumed that foreign affairs
related powers were “executive” in this sense.320 Yet this second
argument was unnecessary. The neutrality proclamation can easily be
explained under the thick version of “the executive power.”
What to make of the claim that the neutrality proclamation is an
example of President Washington “setting” the foreign policy of the
United States and the claim of many scholars that presidents routinely
set foreign policy?321 Where does the president get such a power?
The question seems largely beside the point. Even Prakash and
Ramsey recognize that when presidents “set” foreign policy, their
“policy” is nonbinding.322 The Monroe Doctrine is a classic example.
President Monroe declared it to be the policy of the United States to
oppose any European intervention in the Americas.323 Yet the very fact
that this doctrine was nonbinding suggests that it was not an exercise
317. Id.
318. Id. at 16.
319. Id. at 11.
320. See supra Part I.A.3.
321. See, e.g., GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER 45, 63 (1997); Prakash & Ramsey,
supra note 9, at 237, 327; Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)treaty Power,
77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 212–15 (1998); John Yoo, Unitary, Executive, or Both?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1935, 1988 (2009) (reviewing STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008)).
322. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 262–63, 263 n.122.
323. Seventh Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1823) (James Monroe), in 2 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 207, 209, 218
(James D. Richardson ed., Washington, Gov’t Pub. Off. 1896). For a summary by the state
department historian, see VINCENT, supra note 308, at 107–13.
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of any constitutional power. After all, President Monroe could not
unilaterally enforce such a doctrine. He could not declare war on his
own if a European nation ignored his threats. He could not repeal
existing commercial regulations or impose new ones without new
congressional laws. In other words, the president may declare a view of
foreign policy, but whether the president has the constitutional powers
to make good on that view is an entirely separate matter.
This suggests that Congress could declare foreign policy for its
purposes, too. Anyone can speak. The House passed a resolution in
support of the French Constitution of 1792 and the French adoption of
a new flag four years later.324 U.S. Senator Tom Cotton, in 2015,
addressed a letter to the Iranian government explaining his view of the
relevant relations between Iran and the United States.325 None of these
instances seems to be an exercise of constitutional power. Whether any
of these actors—the president, the House of Representatives, or a
single U.S. Senator—has any power to make good on what they say is
a matter of constitutional power.
2. Terminating Treaties. The Neutrality Proclamation also sheds
light on another issue of presidential power—the ability to terminate
treaties. Prakash and Ramsey argue that under the U.S. Constitution,
“the question is which branch has the power to make the requisite
determinations and to direct the delivery of the appropriate notice” to
terminate a treaty.326 Although this question has greatly troubled
foreign affairs scholarship, they write, the residual vesting thesis “yields
a clear answer. Terminating a treaty in accordance with its express
terms or with international law is a power not mentioned directly in the
Constitution, but was obviously part of the traditional executive’s
foreign affairs power.”327

324. The episodes are described in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:
THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 175–76, 175 n.17 (1997). To be sure, Washington asked
that both resolutions be delivered through him. Id. But it is hardly clear that this was
constitutionally necessary. Jefferson argued that the House “had a right, independently of
legislation, to express sentiments on other subjects,” though they should communicate to foreign
powers through the president. Id. (quoting The Anas (recording Jefferson’s notes from March 12,
1792), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 87, 111 (H.A. Washington ed., Washington,
Taylor & Maury 1854)).
325. Press Release, Tom Cotton, Sen. from Arkansas, Cotton and 46 Fellow Senators to Send
Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar. 9, 2015),
https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=120 [https://perma.cc/S66Q-BZ7G].
326. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 265.
327. Id.
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Once again, though, a thick understanding of “the executive
power” better explains the legal framework. Washington’s neutrality
proclamation effectively declared the previous treaty of alliance with
France terminated because of the radically different French
government then existing. Obviously, if conditions have occurred that
require the termination of a treaty or a finding that the treaty has
already been terminated by the other sovereign, then the president
cannot execute that treaty as though it were still in force and at the
same time be “faithfully” executing the law. To execute the treaties,
the president has to decide whether they are still in force. A residual
vesting of all royal prerogative powers is not necessary to obtain this
result.
To be sure, this discussion does not answer the question of how to
terminate treaties that do not specify conditions by which they may be
considered terminated. Prakash and Ramsey do not have an answer to
that problem. They recognize a tension between the argument that the
power to terminate “plainly” belonged to the monarch and the fact that
treaties are the supreme law of the land.328 A thick understanding of
“the executive power” resolves at least a part of this tension. The
president must faithfully execute a treaty that is still in force. In so
doing, the president may determine if the treaty is no longer in force
but may not decide whether it should not be in force. Other grants of
power in the Constitution better account for treaty termination when
the treaty does not specify the conditions of termination. For example,
if a treaty is not self-executing, then it seems up to Congress (with the
president’s signature) to repeal implementing legislation.329
If, however, the treaty is both self-executing and omits the
conditions by which it can be declared terminated, then it seems that
just as any other law has to be repealed, the treaty would have to be
repealed by the same authority that made it—at a minimum the Senate
and the president together, or Congress as a whole and the president.
This appears to have been the early practice and understanding.330

328. Id. at 265 n.135. Thus, they conclude that “[i]t is not clear what effect the combination of
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI and the Take Care Clause of Article II, Section 2 would have
on this analysis,” and they leave the problem for another day. Id.
329. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L
L. 695, 695 (1995) (describing the difference between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties).
330. See J. Terry Emerson, The Legislative Role in Treaty Abrogation, 5 J. LEGIS. 46, 48–55
(1978) (arguing that the historical tradition of shared responsibility for abrogation of treaties has
eroded).
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Prakash and Ramsey claim the power to terminate treaties “was
obviously part of the traditional executive’s foreign affairs power,”331
but their support for this claim is not clear. Insofar as the British
monarch had such a power, that could be because the monarch had the
power to make the treaties and, as explained, it was understood that
the power to make a treaty included the power to terminate it. Of
course, whether or not the early understanding was a correct
understanding of the constitutional text is somewhat beside the point,
which is that wherever this termination power came from, it is not clear
that anyone thought it derived from “the executive power.”
At a minimum, the thick understanding of “the executive power”
provides clear answers some of the time. The president may determine
that the conditions leading to termination have been met as part of “the
executive power” to interpret and carry into execution those treaties
that specify such conditions. For a non-self-executing treaty without
such conditions, it seems left to Congress and the president, through
the enactment of legislation, to decide whether or not to implement the
treaty. And although this Article cannot give a definitive answer to
self-executing treaties without conditions of termination, it at least
appears that members of the Founding generation understood the
power to terminate a treaty to be included within the power to make
it. Whether or not this historical understanding is ultimately correct as
a matter of the Constitution’s text, certainly no one appears to have
thought that the right to terminate was part of “the executive power.”
3. Instructing and Recalling Ambassadors. Instructing and
recalling ambassadors are two other presidential powers that Prakash
and Ramsey claim are inexplicable on the basis of the constitutional
text absent the residual vesting thesis.332 The only remotely applicable
textual grant, they argue, is the power to appoint (by and with advice
and consent of the Senate) ambassadors; but this “surely cannot convey
to the President alone the power to recall them.”333 Ambassadors are
not analogous to other executive officers unless one thinks that the
president must carry into execution the power over foreign affairs.
This, they argue, assumes the very point that is to be demonstrated.334

331.
332.
333.
334.

Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 265.
Id. at 244.
Id.
Id. at 244–45.
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But that is a very cramped view of the textual grants of presidential
power. The answer seems more straightforward: the president has the
power to make treaties and present them to the Senate for advice and
consent. The Constitution itself, in other words, tasks the president
with a particular trust—the trust of negotiating and securing treaties.
The “executive power of the laws” that belongs to the president
extends to the power to execute this trust. Just as with the removal of
domestic executive officers, the president cannot possibly hope to
execute this trust alone and must therefore rely on assistants. The
president may therefore appoint, direct, and remove them as part of
this executive power, subject to any constitutional provisions assigning
such powers away. The only provision to do so gives the Senate a role
in confirming appointments.
To be sure, ambassadors do more than just negotiate treaties on
behalf of the president. They also gather information incident to such
negotiations and help to ensure the foreign power properly executes
the treaty. These tasks, too, are part of “the executive power” to carry
into execution existing treaties or to carry into execution the
constitutional trust to make treaties. Ambassadors also maintain
friendly relations; but that could also be considered as part of “the
executive power” to ensure existing treaties are honored. Even if
ambassadors do other things that cannot be explained as part of the
power to make treaties or carry existing treaties into execution, surely
they exercise enough of the president’s “executive power of the laws”
that they are subject to recall and instruction.
Indeed, as explained above, the delegates in the Constitutional
Convention certainly did not think a general foreign affairs power—
presumably including the power to recall and instruct ambassadors—
was missing. Charles Pinckney observed that “the Senate is to have the
power of making treaties & managing our foreign affairs,” although the
Senate at that point had little more than the treaty and appointment
powers.335 And the power to make treaties may have included the
power to “treat” with foreign nations generally.336 Blackstone,
moreover, argued that the king was the depository of the nation’s
foreign affairs powers, but he only listed the prerogatives that also
found their way into the U.S. Constitution.337

335. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 183–84, 235 (emphasis added).
336. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
337. See supra Parts I.B, II.A.
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There are other arguments to which one can resort without a
residual grant of foreign affairs powers. As Hamilton wrote in his
Pacificus essays, if it was up to Congress to declare war, was it not up
to the president to “execute” the existing conditions of peace, until war
could be declared?338 Although surely not decisive, it is notable that the
key debates over the removal power in 1789 revolved around the
secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs.339 Presumably this
secretary had little to do with the “execution” of domestic laws.340 The
secretary was to be responsible for ambassadors and their duties.341 Yet
the First Congress obviously saw no distinction between this principal
officer and the principal officers of the other executive departments.
There is, however, one important document involving managing
ambassadors, and managing foreign affairs generally, that may be
taken as evidence of the residual vesting thesis. In 1790, Thomas
Jefferson wrote an opinion for President Washington addressing
whether the Senate could negative the grade of the ambassador that
the president recommends along with the appointment. Jefferson
answered in the negative, writing that the Constitution “has declared
that ‘the Executive powers shall be vested in the President,’ submitting
only special articles of it to a negative by the Senate,” and that “[t]he
transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive altogether”
and therefore “belongs then to the head of that department, except as
to such portions of it as are specially submitted to the Senate.”342
At first blush, this letter does seem to support the residual vesting
reading of the clause; and if Jefferson and Hamilton are in rare
agreement, that would make this reading all the more persuasive. It is
possible, however, to read Jefferson’s letter consistently with
Madison’s view in the removal debates of 1789. True, Jefferson says
that the transaction of business with foreign nations is “Executive,” and

338. PACIFICUS, supra note 68, at 13 (“If the Legislature have a right to make war on the one
hand—it is on the other the duty of the Executive to preserve Peace till war is declared.”).
339. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); supra Part III.A.
340. Though, as explained, this officer did eventually become responsible for some duties that
would have been assigned to a home office had such an office been established, including
overseeing district attorneys. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
341. The statute required the secretary to execute such duties delegated by the president
“relative to correspondences, commissions or instructions to or with public ministers or consuls,
from the United States, or to negotiations with public ministers from foreign states or princes, or
to memorials or other applications from foreign public ministers or other foreigners, or to such
other matters respecting foreign affairs.” Act of July 27, 1789, 1 Stat. 28, 29.
342. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic
Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 158, at 109–10.
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the subsequent reference to exceptions seems to suggest that Jefferson
views foreign affairs within the grant of power in the Executive Vesting
Clause. But note that Jefferson actually misquotes the clause, writing
that it vests “the Executive powers,” in the plural, in the president. Of
course, that is not what the clause actually does.
Recall also, yet again, that the Convention likely understood that
the Senate would have the management of foreign affairs when the
Senate had the treaty and appointment powers. It could be, then, that
the president has the management of foreign affairs because of these
two powers, not because of the Executive Vesting Clause. Indeed,
Jefferson’s whole letter is addressing the scope of the Senate’s
appointment power—he is addressing whether the Senate’s
appointment power allows them to negative the grade of the
ambassador or simply to negative the nominee. As previously
explained, the appointment power is part of “the executive power,”
because the president cannot execute the law—and cannot conduct
foreign affairs—alone. In short, Jefferson’s letter is some evidence in
favor of the residual vesting thesis, but the matter is not entirely clear.
4. Recognition. The president’s power to recognize foreign
governments has been a matter of constitutional litigation in recent
years.343 What constitutional actor has the power to recognize foreign
governments hardly depends on a residual grant of “the executive
power.” The president has the duty to receive ambassadors, and as
Hamilton wrote, this right “includes that of judging, in the case of a
Revolution of Government in a foreign Country, whether the new
rulers are competent organs of the National Will and ought to ⟨be⟩
recognised or not.”344 Thus, there is an explicit textual hook for the
president’s recognition power on some occasions—at least when
foreign ambassadors present their credentials. That hardly means
Congress has no power to recognize foreign governments. Congress
can establish offices, including ambassadorships; it can choose which
such offices to establish and in what countries. And Congress can
regulate foreign trade and thereby implicitly recognize a foreign
government.
The dispute over recognition in modern times has been more
specifically over whether that power is exclusively presidential; in

343. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1, 12–14 (2015).
344. PACIFICUS, supra note 68, at 14.
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Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II),345 the Supreme
Court said yes, but relied on functional considerations.346 It had to rely
on such considerations because the Court’s conclusion is indefensible
on any account of the text. Even an indefeasible grant of residual
power to the president does not include any prerogative powers
granted to Congress. On any account of the text, it is hard to see how
the recognition power is exclusive.
5. Torturing Terrorists. The same short analysis solves the riddle
of “torturing terrorists.” Even under an indefeasible residual grant of
power, the president only has such powers not granted to Congress.
Yet, as Professor McConnell explains, Congress has the prerogative
power to make rules and regulations for the armed forces.347 It is clearly
within Congress’s power, in other words, to prohibit torture. The only
situation in which the president might be able to authorize torture is if
Congress has not legislated on the matter, and the torture occurred in
an actual field of battle while the president was acting as commander
in chief. But even if the president could authorize torture under such
circumstances, that result would not depend on any residual grant of
prerogative power; it would depend on one’s interpretation of the
commander-in-chief power.
6. Executive Agreements. In addition to calling into question
claims of a unilateral presidential power to terminate treaties, the thick
law-execution account calls into question the validity of executive
agreements: those non-treaty agreements entered into between the
president and the head of a foreign nation. If entering into “executive
agreements” without Senate ratification is an executive (prerogative)
foreign affairs power, then it would certainly belong to the president

345. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1 (2015).
346. According to the Court,
Recognition is a topic on which the Nation must “speak . . . with one voice.” That
voice must be the President’s. Between the two political branches, only the Executive
has the characteristic of unity at all times. And with unity comes the ability to exercise,
to a greater degree, “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.” The President is
capable, in ways Congress is not, of engaging in the delicate and often secret diplomatic
contacts that may lead to a decision on recognition. He is also better positioned to take
the decisive, unequivocal action necessary to recognize other states at international
law.
Id. at 14–15 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003); then quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 74, at
423–24 (Alexander Hamilton)).
347. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 225).
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under a residual grant of power; there is no other constitutional text on
point. But must the theory of “the executive power” square with the
existence of executive agreements? It seems much more plausible that
at least some of these agreements—innovations of the late nineteenth
century, and even then they were mostly aberrations until the midtwentieth century348—are unconstitutional. We should not worry about
making a theory of “the executive power,” as it was understood in the
late eighteenth century, fit with novel practices of the late nineteenth.
In any event, some binding executive agreements might be
constitutionally justified as permissible delegations of legislative
authority from Congress to the executive.349 And non-binding
executive agreements can be considered in the same terms as “setting”
foreign policy—any president may speak. Whether there is any
constitutional power to back it up is then entirely a matter of
independent constitutional power or statutory authorizations from
Congress. Regardless, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the CurtissWright case to the effect that the powers of “external sovereignty” must
exist somewhere350—and therefore, for example, perhaps a power to
make executive agreements need not depend on specific affirmative
grants of power in the Constitution—is dubious.
CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested an interpretation of “the executive
power” that fits constitutional text, structure, intent, and historical
practice better than any competing theory. It is the only theory that fits
the variety of textual evidence for the proposition that “the executive
power” was the power to execute law, that fits the instruction of the
delegates in the Constitutional Convention and the silence of
opponents during ratification, that makes sense in light of the
delegates’ likely views on the power to erect corporations and over
immigration, that makes the three vesting clauses cohere, and that fits
most prior practice in the domestic front and in foreign affairs.
It is sometimes said today that an originalist interpretation of the
Constitution would lead to a president who is “above the law.”351 But

348. See Hathaway, supra note 306, at 144–45.
349. As Professor Oona Hathaway has detailed, most executive agreements are in fact made
pursuant to congressional delegations of authority. Id. at 144–46.
350. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317–18 (1936).
351. See, e.g., Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1175 (suggesting the
consequences of the residual vesting thesis and asking, “Surely the President isn’t above the
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under the interpretation presented here, the president is by no means
above the law. To be sure, under this account, the president has more
indefeasible power on the domestic front than on a thin law-execution
account of “the executive power.” And in foreign affairs, many
presidential powers can in fact be explained by the thick law-execution
reading of “the executive power,” although not all of them. But the
executive that emerges from this analysis is largely subservient to
Congress on matters both foreign and domestic, albeit with ample
powers to carry Congress’s laws into effect, as the executive sees fit,
within the confines established by those laws.

law?”); see also David E. Graham, The Dual U.S. Standard for the Treatment and Interrogation of
Detainees: Unlawful and Unworkable, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 325, 326 n.2 (2009) (“The ‘CommanderAbove-the-Law’ is a term sometimes used to depict the current Administration’s interpretation
and implementation of the unitary executive concept.” (citing JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE
LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR 89–91
(2007))).

